Institute of Philosophy
of the Russian Academy of Sciences




  Mogens Lærke Sketch of a Metaphysics of Absolute Exteriority. Some reflections on Spinoza’s theory of causality and ontology of power
Home Page » » History of Philosophy » History of Philosophy, 2010, vol. 15. » Mogens Lærke Sketch of a Metaphysics of Absolute Exteriority. Some reflections on Spinoza’s theory of causality and ontology of power

Mogens Lærke Sketch of a Metaphysics of Absolute Exteriority. Some reflections on Spinoza’s theory of causality and ontology of power

In this article, I argue against the idea that Spinoza’s notion of immanence can be understood as logical inherence in the Leibnizian sense (i.e. according to the principle of predicate-in-subject). Through an analysis of the fundamental categories of Spinoza’s theory of causality (causa sui, causa immanens, causa transiens), I demonstrate that Spinoza’s system can be reconstructed as a radical causal rationalism or ontology of power and action. I maintain that Spinoza’s system of immanence must be understood — somewhat contra-intuitively — as a philosophy of «absolute exteriority». Hence, when Spinoza maintains with Saint Paul that «in God, we move and live and have our being», we must understand the preposition «in» in the sense of being in action, rather than in the sense of being in a subject.

 

Keywords: causality, self-causation, immanence, inherence, power, exteriority, subject, ontology