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Philosophy of Science and Technology, 2019, Vol. 24, No. 1
CONTENTS IN MEMORIAM Vyacheslav Semyonovich Stepin (19.08.1934‒14.12.2018). DOI: 10.21146/2413-9084-2019-24-1-5-6
SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIETY Science and culture coevolution in Vyacheslav S. Stepin’s works. Papers of the “round table”. 22 January, 2019 a «round table» discussion devoted to the memory of Vyacheslav Stepin was held at the Institute of Philosophy of the Russian Academy of Sciences. It was organized by the Department of Interdisciplinary Problems in the Advance of Science and Technology, where Vyacheslav Stepin was one of the department’s creators and closely collaborated with its research fellows ever since. Three major subjects that V. Stepin worked at were proposed for the discussion: 1) problems of technological civilization’s crisis and outlook for natural science and humanitarian knowledge convergence; 2) evolution of the ideas of scientific rationality types in context of modern technological order formation; 3) cultural universals and their role in shaping global world development scenarios. All the discussion participants’ talks demonstrate not only the wholeness of Stepin’s diverse research interests and his heritage, but also directions and contexts variety where ideas and concepts, constituting this heritage, find or are expected to find application. Participants of the Round table tell about Stepin’s final achievements on the issues under discussion as well as about the evolution of their appearance, style and methods of the master’s creative laboratory, his personal positions and leanings towards science and communication with colleagues and students. We learn a lot about the early researcher’s life and work period, his social network and also about the development of philosophers of science scientific interests, when there was the era of “storm and onslaught” of the sixties. For the last ten years Vyacheslav Stepin considered his most important task to implement his megaproject about unified methodology for natural sciences and humanities. Ideas of this project were discussed. Keywords: V.S. Stepin, post-non-classics, scientific rationality types, culture universals, technological civilization, synergetics, interdisciplinarity, complexity, philosophy of science, methodology DOI: 10.21146/2413-9084-2019-24-1-5-6
RESEARCH PROGRAMS OF EPISTEMOLOG Tom Rockmore. Some consequences of Kant’s Copernican turn. Kant turns from an early representational view of cognition to a later anti-representational, epistemic constructivist view, often simply referred to as the Copernican revolution or the Copernican turn. Kant’s Copernican turn belongs to the modern, non-standard interest in epistemic constructivism. At least since Parmenides the standard approach to cognition requires knowledge of the real, reality or the world. In modern philosophy this approach is countered by the emergence of epistemic constructivism as a non-standard solution for the cognitive problem in Francis Bacon, Hobbes, Vico, and others, and independently in Kant. This paper briefly describes consequences of Kant’s Copernican turn concerning at least five themes: (i) cognition, (ii) German idealism, (iii) the subject, (iv) the historical character of knowledge and (v) the success or failure of the philosophical tradition. DOI: 10.21146/2413-9084-2019-24-1-46-60 Sergey L. Katrechko. Comments on the Tom Rockmore’s article “Some сonsequences of Kant’s Copernican turn”. What is the main idea of Kant’s transcendental philosophy and Copernican Revolution? The Kantian transcendentalism is the first theory of experience related to the solution of the semantic problem set in his letter to M. Hertz (02.21.1772) about the ground of the relation of our [a priori] representation to the object. There are two ways to solve it: realism (the empirical vector from the real things/objects to representations) and constructivism (the vector from the a priori form (or ‘representations’) to the objects). But Kantian transcendental idealism is not constructivism, because Kant keeps the empirical (realistic) vector by affixing our sensibility with things/objects and says that his theory of experience is an empirical realism. The Kantian transcendentalism as altered method of human thinking in metaphysics is associated with the splitting of the thing/object into the actual/real object (Kantian thing-in-itself) and object of experience (Kantian appearance), that mediate the relationship between things and representations, or the transcendental triad «object (thing-in-itself) — appearance — representation». Unlike modern epistemic constructivism as a procedure for constructing objects, Kant develops transcendental constructivism in mathematics as cognition through construction of concepts in intuition, i.e. constructivism regarding appearances, but not things–in–themselves. Vladimir I. Przhilenskiy. Comments on the Tom Rockmore’s article “Some consequences of Kant’s Copernican turn”. The “remarks” assess the consistency of T. Rockmore’s assertion that Kant’s philosophy creates the possibility of further development of anti-representationalist and constructivist ideas. They criticize the reduction of the turn to the statement that phenomena are only representations, not things-in-themselves. Rockmore’s interpretation of the turn is opposed to a more traditional position whereby I. Kant changed a ratio of theoretical and practical in the hierarchy of knowledge, which caused a “revolutionary” and “turnable” revision of the whole idea of mind, its structure and content. Tom Rockmore. Replies to comments by Profs. Katrechko and Przhilenskiy. The replies given by the author to Profs. Katrechko and Prof. Przhilenskiy are very different. Prof. Katrechko approaches Kant as if he was a contemporary thinker simultaneously committed to correlationism, a semanticist, a follower of Strawson, a representationalist, and so on. The response is that he is not a contemporary thinker. What remains is Prof. Katrechko’s view that he shares with some other Kantian scholars that the critical philosophy is a form of representationalism. Prof. Przhilenskiy begins by agreeing that Kant can in fact be read as supporting anti-representational and constructivist ideas, while suggesting that the Copernican turn can be read in different ways. He attributes to the author the view that phenomena are just representations, whereas, on the contrary, the author claims, though perhaps not clearly enough, that the mature Kant turns away from representationalism. DOI: 10.21146/2413-9084-2019-24-1-72-75
HISTORICAL EPISTEMOLOGY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY Sergey N. Korsakov. Page from the history of philosophical problems of physics in the USSR: Eduard Fritsevich Lepin (1893‒1937). The article provides a sketch of the scientific biography of the Soviet philosopher Edward Fritsevich Lepin. Lepin was a supporter of the school of academician Deborin in philosophy, a specialist in philosophical problems of physics. He graduated from the philosophical branch of the Institute of Red Professors. He worked in the Leningrad branch of the Institute of Philosophy. He developed methodological problems of new areas of physics: quantum mechanics and relativity. He studied the following questions: the correlation of dynamic and statistical regularity, the reverse effect of the investigation on the cause, the account of the probability in the knowledge of physical processes. He considered it necessary to apply the obtained methodological principles not only in physics but also in biology. In philosophical terms, Lepin's ideas were ahead of time by 30 years. In 1935 Lepin was arrested and sentenced to imprisonment in penal servitude. Unfortunately he lectured his friends on philosophy and sharply criticized the Stalinist regime. For this Lepin and his listeners were re-arrested and shot. Keywords: E. F. Lepin, A. M. Deborin, Soviet philosophy, Deborin’s school, philosophical problems of physics, Stalin's repressions
Dmitry N. Radul. Genesis of the idea of actual infinity in Florensky’s philosophical system. The formation of Florensky’s ideas about the idea of actual infinity is described in detail. The influence of mathematicians of Moscow University on young Florensky is considered. Special attention is paid to the role of Professor of Moscow University N. V. Bugaeva in the formation of Florensky’s ideas of discontinuous and continuous. Describes the relationship of the ideas of mathematical set theory and religious teachings of imiaslavie in the works of P. Florensky, N. Luzin and D. Egorov. The participation of P. Florensky in the movement of symbolists of the Silver age is briefly characterized. Understanding the symbol Florensky associated with the Cantor’s idea of transfinite. On this basis Florensky forms his understanding of the “new art”. The influence of Vladimir Solovyov’s philosophy of unity on the formation of Florensky’s religious and philosophical ideas is traced. Florensky understands Vladimir Solovyov’s “unity” as a complete synthesis of absolute knowledge. And such knowledge, according to Florensky, is possible only through the acceptance of the idea of absolute infinity as an absolute divine Truth. The role of Serapion (Mashkin) in the process of formation of Florensky’s worldview is especially noted. Serapion (Mashkin) considered the Cantor concept of set from the point of view of unity and Orthodox dogmatics. In the future these ideas were actively developed by Florensky. The idea of actual infinity Serapion (Mashkin) and Florensky was associated with philosophical and natural science atomism. The actual infinity was understood by them as a set of indivisible elements – atoms. The influence of the ideas of atomism and actual infinity on optics, thermodynamics and electrodynamics is considered separately. The attempt of Serapion (Mashkin) and Florensky to solve the problem of paradoxes of actual infinity through an introduction to the philosophical system of antinomies is briefly described. Keywords: P. Florensky, G. Cantor, actual infinity, potential infinity, symbol, transfinite numbers, Absolute, Trinity, Grace DOI: 10.21146/2413-9084-2019-24-1-90-99
EPISTEMOLOGY AND COGNITIVE SCIENCES Mikhail A. Sushchin. Visual consciousness, representations and actions. This article considers the problem of the nature of human visual consciousness in light of objective limitations of visual mechanisms known from psychology and physiology. The problem has attracted attention of specialists in the fields of cognitive science and consciousness studies in the past two decades because of resonant experimental work on phenomena of change blindness and inattentional blindness. The author assumes that, despite known limitations of human visual cognition, subjects have the impression of a stable and rich visual experience. It is pointed out that there are three main factors that create this impression, namely bodily activity, immediate visual representations and the impression of the presence of hidden parts of perceived objects and scenes (amodal perception). It is asserted that without explaining these three essential aspects of the problem, it is impossible to understand the nature of human visual consciousness. The only theory that explicitly addresses all three aspects of the problem is the sensory-motor account of vision and visual consciousness of J. K. O’Regan and A. Noë. Nevertheless it is argued that the attempt of these authors to deny the immediate visual representations is not justified. At the present moment, empirical studies of the phenomenon of change blindness cannot support the claim the subjects lack visual representations. The conception of visual ensembles offers the most promising way of understanding the character of visual representations. In addition, modern Bayesian models of perception may help to account for the phenomenon of amodal perception, which is the third component of the problem. It is maintained that the problem of the nature of human visual consciousness should be addressed within the representational perspective. Keywords: visual consciousness, cognitive science, representation, action, amodal perception DOI: 10.21146/2413-9084-2019-24-1-100-116
Аlexander А. Gusev. Representationalism and two theses of experience transparency. The article deals with the problem of separation of representational (intentional) and phenomenal aspects of conscious experience. The aim of the work is to consider the advantages of reductive representationalism as a philosophical theory of consciousness, within which the phenomenal aspect is reduced to representational content. The novelty of this research is that the author considers one of the main arguments put forward in favor of representationalism, which has not a detailed analysis in the Russian-language literature. This is an argument from the “transparency of experience”. According to many thinkers, this argument is one of the main motivating factors for adopting a reductionist strategy to the phenomenal qualities of experience. This argument, based primarily on the case of visual perception, is aimed at showing the absence of some inner phenomenal aspect of our experience, not related to the qualities of external objects. The author introduces his own dichotomy of visual experience introspection, which can strengthen the position of reductive representationalists. He refers to the work of Amy Kind, in which she proposed her reading of this argument, highlighting his strong and weak version. Further, as a result of the Sydney Shoemaker`s position analysis, considered as the defender of the weak version of the argument, the author concludes that Shoemaker substitutes the epistemic simple concept of qualia by metaphysical, not grasped in the theoretically unloaded introspection of visual experience. In conclusion, the author suggests that, although representationalism is unlikely to be able to help in the naturalization of consciousness within the framework of an anti-physicalist debate, yet such a view of the mental can play the role of a bridge between the subjectivist ontology of consciousness and the objectivist ontology of the natural sciences. Keywords: philosophy of mind, philosophy of perception, representationalism, qualia, phenomenal consciousness, intentionality, introspection, sense-data THEORY AND METHODOLOGY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY Amina Z. Fakhrutdinova. Models of rationality in the bases of the theory of decision-making. The aim of the article is to analyze the development of the theory of solutions in the context of changing models of rationality. To achieve this goal, historical and relatively historical methods were used. With their help followed the development of two approaches of the theory of decision-making: normative and descriptive. It is shown that the evolution of the theory of decision-making was influenced by models of scientific rationality, and they, in turn, reflected the development of natural and social rationality. Initially, the normative decision theory was based on the full (classical) rationality. This model assumed the orientation of the decision-maker to maximize the result and the possession of an unlimited amount of information. Another approach is descriptive – in fact, denied the possibility of rational behavior and freedom of choice. This approach revealed deviations from rational behavior. During the development of both theories discovered how the limitations of the model of comprehensive rationality, and the incorrectness of the concepts of rigid determinism of the selection process of objective factors. Modern decision theory seeks to synthesize both approaches and expand the understanding of the rational solution. It has been found that a new understanding of rationality is not unique to decision theory. This is only a special case, which fits into the General trend of development of social knowledge and management. The revision of rationality was carried out in the economy as a whole, the theory of selective behavior, forecasting, theoretical sociology, philosophy and other areas of social knowledge. It is shown that in all these areas we are talking about post-non-classical interpretation based on the views about the possibility of rationality in its reflexive and communicative forms. Keywords: rationality models, normative and descriptive approaches, limited rationality, reflexive rationality DOI: 10.21146/2413-9084-2019-24-1-159-167
Naseeb A. Siddiqui. Beyond the coincidental fine-tuning of the universe: The ontology of Essential Time. The first part of this research discussed a theoretical framework of a new theory of time which was systematically proposed, developed and defended. Time was exposed to a natural categorization that calls forth two different real times; Existential and Essential. The current paper which is the conclusion of the research deals with the ontological dimension of Essential time. Contrary to the fine-tuning of physical constants of the universe by coincidence, this article tries to establish that “coincidence” in itself depends on time. The Essential time provides a timeline of creation which starts from absolute uniformity to dis-uniform universe and coincidence is planned. Hence, essential time is uniform, formless and powerful to facilitate the creation of the universe by forming dis-uniformity to everything that was uniform. The question that why essential time is able to do that and what is the source to trigger dis-uniformity brings the discussion to the ontology of essential time. This ontological being in essential time will be proved by two premises. The article argues that why the interpretation based on essential time must be considered instead of “coincidences” of modern science, “Demiurge” of Plato and “unmoved mover” of Aristotle to explain the final cause of the universe. By doing so the fundamental flaw in the anthropic principle is revealed and argued that it does not present a convincing answer to the “why” question of the universe. The combinations of scientific, philosophical and metaphysical arguments establish a conclusive interpretation about the ontological being in essential time without any deviation from the universal facts of the universe. This might end the creation dilemma which is, why did the universe come into existence. DOI: 10.21146/2413-9084-2019-24-1-145-158
BOOK SHELF Stanislava A. Filipenok. Review of the book by Julia S. Morkina “Poetic Creativity: Philosophical Analysis” (Moscow: Kanon+ ROOI “Reabilitatsiya” Publ., 2017. 304 pp.). J.S. Morkina`s book “Poetic Creativity: Philosophical Analysis” deals with the problems related to the poetic creativity, creative situation and the creative functions of consciousness. For the analysis of poetic composition, the phenomenological method is used, thanks to which poetic composition is presented as a complex ideal system of meanings in the consciousness and at the same time as an intentional object. The author proposes the autopoietic model of consciousness, which makes it possible to explain the creation of new meanings by consciousness both in everyday life and in poetic creativity. This model describes the continual self-construction of consciousness in the process of generating the new meanings. The meanings created by consciousness in its being are treated as the reflective units. J.S. Morkina examines the concepts of ideal interpreter, poetic composition, etc. The ideal interpreter is considered as an ideal object responsible for the entire content of composition as a system of meanings. Poetic composition is defined as a system of concepts, where each word is included in writer`s and reader`s cultural and personal context. This monograph reconstructs the model of insight as exit from specific pre-insight state. Insight is described as a risky existential situation for creative consciousness. Keywords: poetic creativity, meaning, autopoietic model of consciousness, complex ideal systems of meanings, phenomenological method, intentional object, poetic composition, interpreter, lyrical hero, insight DOI: 10.21146/2413-9084-2019-24-1-159-167
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