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CONTENTS

Two Arguments against Hedonism in Plato's *Gorgias*

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Abstract. The article examines some of the logical and conceptual problems related to two formal antihedonist arguments that are put forward by Plato's Socrates in his conversation with Callicles in *Gorgias*. According to the first argument (495e-497a) good and evil cannot be identical with pleasure and pain, because pleasure is compatible with pain at the same time and in the same place, but good and evil are incompatible with each other. However, the very incompatibility of good and evil is inferred by Socrates from the incompatibility of the opposites in general, among which he numbers also pleasure and pain, thus contradicting himself. The second argument (497e-499a) includes the claim that, given the hedonist identification of good with pleasure and evil with pain, those who feel pleasure should be regarded as good and those who suffer as bad, because it is the presence of good in a man that makes him good and the presence of evils that makes him bad. But these latter statements imply the perfectionist notion of good as something which "makes good" a certain being, and, though this notion is shared by Socrates himself (506c-507a), hedonists are not at all bound to share it too.

Keywords: ancient philosophy, good and evil, *Gorgias* (dialogue), hedonism, perfectionism, pleasure, Plato, Socrates.

In the dialogue *Gorgias* Plato's Socrates takes an antihedonist stand[1] which, in my opinion, is already implicit in his conversation with Polus,[2] but is explicitly stated only in his conversation with Callicles, in which he puts forward two formal arguments against hedonism. In this article I would like to examine some logical and conceptual problems connected with these arguments.

1) The first argument against hedonism: incompatibility of opposites

The first argument directed against hedonistic identification of good and pleasure can be presented in the following set of theses.

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(1) Happy people (τοὺς εὖ πράττοντας) experience a state that is opposite (τοὐναντίον... πάθος πεπονθέναι) to that of unhappy people (τοῖς κακῶς πράττουσιν) (495e2-4).

(2) If these states are opposites of each other it is necessary (εἴπερ ἐναντία ἐστὶν ταῦτα ἀλλήλοις, ἀνάγκη) that they should be the same as health and sickness: health and sickness are experienced by man only in turns (ἐν μέρει) and not simultaneously (ἅμα), at least in one and the same place (495e6-496b3).

(3) The same is true of strength and weakness, as well as of speed and slowness (496b3-4).

(4) Consequently, good and happiness (τἀγαθὰ καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν) and their opposites (τἀναντία τούτων) evil and unhappiness (κακά τε καὶ ἀθλιότητα) are achieved and lost by man in turns (ἐν μέρει λαμβάνει καὶ ἐν μέρει ἀπαλλάττεται) (496b5-7).

(5) Consequently, if there are things that man simultaneously loses and retains (ἄττα ὧν ἅμα τε ἀπαλλάττεται ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἅμα ἔχει), they are neither good nor evil (τό τε ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακόν) (496c1-4).

(6) Hunger, thirst and in general any need and any desire (ἅπασαν ἔνδειαν καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν) constitute pain (ἀνιαρὸν) (496c6-d4).

(7) Quenching thirst (and by implication other needs) is pleasure (ἡδονή) (496d5-6).

(8) When a thirsty man drinks (i.e., someone who feels a need gratifies it), the sufferer (λυπούμενον) simultaneously (ἅμα) experiences pleasure or "enjoyment" (χαίρειν) in one and the same place of the soul or body (which makes no difference) (496a6-e8).

(9) Consequently, it is possible for a man in pain to be simultaneously glad (Ἀνιώμενον δέ γε χαίρειν δυνατὸν) (497a2).

(10) Consequently, in accordance with (4-5), "enjoying" is not doing well (Οὐκ ἄρα τὸ χαίρειν ἐστὶν εὖ πράττειν), nor is being in pain doing badly (οὐδὲ τὸ ἀνιᾶσθαι κακῶς); and so the pleasant turns out to be different from the good (ἕτερον γίγνεται τὸ ἡδὺ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ)" (497a3-5; *here and elsewhere quotations from "Gorgias" are borrowed from T. Irwin's translation* [11]).

To simplify, the argument boils down to this: (a) happiness and unhappiness or good and evil[3] are opposites, (b) opposites (for example, health and sickness, etc.) cannot be compatible, i.e., be present in one and the same subject at one and the same time and in one and the same place (let us call it the thesis on incompatibility of opposites TIO[4]), but (c) pleasure and pain may be experienced by one and the same subject at the same time and at the same place.[5] In that case pleasure cannot be identical to good and happiness, and pain to evil and unhappiness because compatible pairs of concepts cannot be identical to incompatible ones.

TIO is not explicitly expressed in the text but in my view it is evidently assumed in (2-4). Although Socrates nowhere refers to health and sickness, strength and weakness, speed and slowness as opposites, he does so *three times* with regard to happiness and unhappiness or good and evil (1-2, 4). That already suggests that the status of opposites ascribed to them plays an important role in his argument. In (2) he declares: "Then [a] *since* these [states, i.e., happiness and unhappiness] are opposite to each other, *mustn't* it be (εἴπερ ἐναντία ἐστὶν ταῦτα ἀλλήλοις, ἀνάγκη) [b] the same with them as with health and sickness (περὶ αὐτῶν ἔχειν ὥσπερ περὶ ὑγιείας ἔχει καὶ νόσου)? For, I take it, [c] a man isn't at the same time healthy and sick (οὐ γὰρ ἅμα δήπου ὑγιαίνει τε καὶ νοσεῖ ὁ ἄνθρωπος), nor does he get rid of health and sickness at the same time (οὐδὲ ἅμα ἀπαλλάττεται ὑγιείας τε καὶ νόσου)" (495e6-9).[6]

I do not see any other meaning that can be read into these words of Socrates except that in his opinion [c] health and sickness are incompatible, but [a] *inasmuch as* happiness and unhappiness are opposites, they are *of necessity* [b] as incompatible as health and sickness (which apparently are assumed to be opposites). Thus in [a] the reference to status of happiness and unhappiness as *opposites* is presented as *grounds* (εἴπερ) that makes *inevitable* (ἀνάγκη) the conclusion on their incompatibility, and that only makes sense if Socrates accepts TIO.[7]

If that is the case the first argument against hedonism that Socrates adduces is highly infelicitous because the question immediately suggests itself whether Socrates considers pleasure and pain to be opposites (cf. [18, p. 113]). If pleasure and pain are also opposites then it follows under TIO that they cannot be compatible, and that contradicts (8-9) which claim that pleasure and pain are quite compatible. But if Socrates renounces (8-9), his entire argument falls: pleasure and pain then turn out to be as incompatible as good and evil or happiness and unhappiness and may indeed coincide with them, and hence hedonism is not logically excluded.

Alternatively, one may allow that Socrates does not consider pleasure and pain to be opposites (cf. Olymp. In Gorg. 31, 1-3; [8, p. 291]). That would be rather odd from the theoretical point of view. If one proceeds from the intuitively convincing criterion of the *content* of these states then at first glance pleasure and pain are as good an example of opposites as health and sickness, happiness and unhappiness, etc. To be sure, from some philosophical perspectives such intuitive perceptions may be challenged, but that calls for additional explicitly formulated arguments that Socrates does not provide.[8] However, he clearly characterizes pleasure and pain as opposites along with good and evil in Gorg. 475a2-5 (cf. [9, p. 231, n. 581]):

"*P.* ...Indeed, you're defining finely now, Socrates, when you define the fine by pleasure and good (ἡδονῇ τε καὶ ἀγαθῷ ὁριζόμενος τὸ καλόν).

S. And surely also when I define the shameful (τὸ αἰσχρὸν) by the opposite (τῷ ἐναντίῳ), distress and evil (λύπῃ τε καὶ κακῷ)?

P. That must be so."

Thus, if in the conversation with Callicles Socrates no longer considers pleasure and pain to be opposites he is obviously inconsistent within one and the

same dialogue. This position would be uncharacteristic of him in the context of the entire body of Plato's works.[9] Thus to say that this argument of Socrates is only valid if pleasure and pain are not assumed to be opposites amounts to admitting that its logical validity hinges on a thesis that is anything but obvious and needs validation and in addition, contradicts the explicit statements of Socrates himself.

Finally, one can suppose that in reality Socrates' argument does not imply TIO. As follows from the above interpretation (2), such a supposition is not borne out by the text. Still, let us look at the logical consequences it may lead to. The whole idea of Socrates here comes down to juxtaposing some of the pairs of concepts he mentions[10] to others on the basis of compatibility/incompatibility: for example, good and evil are incompatible while pleasure and pain are compatible, so that good and evil cannot be identical with pleasure and pain.[11] But then the question arises how do we know in the first place that good and evil are incompatible? In my view, the only answer to the question that is offered in the text is to invoke TIO: good and evil are opposites and therefore *must* be incompatible. If one assumes that Socrates does not subscribe to the TIO it is unclear on what grounds he concludes, from incompatibility of health and sickness, etc. in (2-3) that happiness and unhappiness or good and evil are incompatible. His position in any case presupposes that there exist, on the one hand, incompatible pairs of notions, like health and sickness (2-3) and, on the other hand, compatible ones, like pleasure and pain (8-9). But what should make us think that happiness and unhappiness, like good and evil, should be referred to the first and not the second of these groups?[12] Of course, Socrates may simply assume that this is factually true or even self-evident. But, first, in this case he has no need to cite other pairs of concepts such as health and sickness. And second, a hedonist would not be under any obligation to agree with such ungrounded declarations. From the hedonist point of view one could, even allowing for compatibility of pleasure and pain, still proceed from the basic identification of good with pleasure and of evil with pain and accordingly infer that good and evil (and the correlating happiness and unhappiness) are also compatible.[13]

To sum up, I have examined three possible interpretations of the first anti-hedonistic argument Socrates advances against Callicles:

(A) the argument implies the TIO and assumes that pleasure and pain are opposites;

(B) the argument implies the TIO but assumes that pleasure and pain are not opposites;

(C) the argument does not imply the TIO.

If one assumes (A), the argument contains a more than evident logical contradiction and is untenable. If one assumes (B), the argument may logically work with an additional proviso which, however, is itself problematical and is at odds with other statements of Socrates. If one assumes (C) the argument offers the possibility of an alternative conclusion opposite to the one Socrates seeks, and therefore does not work either. In my view, (B) and (C) in any case do not cor-

respond to the text of *Gorgias*. That leaves (A) and the argument must be considered a failure. The main problem of Socrates is as follows: he seeks to separate good and evil as an *incompatible* pair of notions and pleasure and pain as a *compatible* pair of notions; but he *derives* the thesis on incompatibility of good and evil from incompatibility of opposites as such (2) and bolsters it by specific examples of incompatibility of some other opposites (2-3). But in that case Socrates has either to admit that pleasure and pain are opposites and hence are also incompatible, or to deny his own assertion that pleasure and pain are opposites or else, renouncing the thesis on incompatibility of opposites, thus put into question the incompatibility of good and evil.

2) The second argument against hedonism: the perfectionist function of good

During his conversation with Socrates Callicles assumes that the best people are reasonable and courageous (489e7-8; 491a7-b4; 491c6-7). Socrates bases his second argument against hedonism on that assumption.

(1) Good people are good (ἀγαθοὺς) due to the presence of goods (ἀγαθῶν παρουσίᾳ) (497e1-2; 498d2-3).

(2) Bad people are bad (κακοὺς) due to the presence of evils (κακῶν δέ γε παρουσίᾳ) (498d3; e1-2).

(3) Good people are reasonable and courageous (οἵ γε φρόνιμοι καὶ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι) (497e3-5;498c2-3).

(4) Bad people are cowardly and unreasonable (οἱ δὲ δειλοὶ καὶ ἄφρονες) (498c3).

(5) Unreasonable people can rejoice and reasonable people can be distressed, i.e., reasonable and unreasonable people feel joy and distress (χαίρουσι καὶ λυποῦνται) in about the same way (497e6-498a5).

(6) Cowardly and courageous people also feel joy and distress in about the same way (498a7-498c1).

(7) Under certain circumstances cowardly people can rejoice and be distressed more than courageous people, for example, when the enemy retreats or attacks (498b5-6; c1).

(8) Consequently, good and bad people, according to (3-4), rejoice and are distressed in roughly the same way (498c4-5).

(9) Good is pleasure and evil is pain (τὰ δὲ ἀγαθὰ εἶναι τὰς ἡδονάς, κακὰ δὲ τὰς ἀνίας) (498d3-4).

(10) Consequently, those who rejoice are good people (ἀγαθοί εἰσιν οἱ χαίροντες), according to (1), because there is pleasure, i.e., good, in them (πάρεστιν τἀγαθά, αἱ ἡδοναί), according to (9) (498d5-7; e2-3).

(11) Accordingly, those who are distressed are bad people (κακοὶ δὲ οἳ ἂν ἀνιῶνται), according to (2) because there is suffering (i.e., evil) in them (πάρεστιν τὰ κακά, αἱ λῦπαι) according to (9) (498d8-e3).

(12) Consequently, good and bad people in (3-4) are about equally good and bad according to (5-6) (498c6-7).

(13) Another version: a good and a bad man are equally good under (5-6), or a bad man (under certain conditions) is even better than a good one, under (7) (499a8-9).

This argument of Socrates reduces Callicles's position to a contradiction proceeding from the fact that it combines the hedonistic thesis that equates pleasure and good (9) with a positive assessment of those who possess some moral virtues, to wit, reasonableness and courage (3). Indeed, if Callicles accepts the theses put forward by Socrates (1-2), whereby the presence of good and evil in man is grounds for considering him to be respectively good or bad, then it follows from the identification of good with pleasure and evil with pain (9) that good people are those who experience pleasure and bad people are those who experience pain (10-11). On the other hand, Callicles recognizes the thesis of Socrates, probably based on empirical observation that, for example, courageous and cowardly people experience roughly similar pleasure and pain (6), and it may even happen that cowardly people experience more pleasure than courageous ones (7). Then, however, under (10-11), he has no grounds for maintaining that good people are always courageous and bad people are always cowardly, that is, he can no longer assert theses (3-4) he initially proceeded from. Otherwise he would have to accept theses (12-13) that contain a contradiction. Thus, Socrates's argument rests on the fact that Callicles cannot simultaneously adhere to the hedonistic concept of good and evil (9) and recognize as good people who possess such moral virtues as reasonableness and courage (3).[14]

Unlike the previous one, this argument of Socrates does not contain obvious contradictions and in my opinion can be seen as formally valid. Nevertheless it is problematic in essence. One may try to show, for example, that it ignores some important aspects of Callicles' ethical position.[15] However, I would rather dwell on another problematic aspect of Socrates's argumentation which in my opinion is more interesting both conceptually and in purely historical terms. I am referring to the somewhat strange logic linking theses (1-2) and (9-11): Socrates obviously takes it for granted that if one accepts the hedonistic identification of good with pleasure and evil with pain (9), people who experience pleasure must be considered to be good (10), and those who experience pain to be bad (11), for it is the presence of goods in a man that provides grounds for considering him to be good (1), whereas the presence of evils in him is grounds for considering him to be bad. (2). Plato's Socrates follows a similar logic also in *Philebus* (cf. [11, p. 203; 4, p. 506, n. 26]) where the proposition that only pleasure is good leads to the following inference:

"[in that case] we would have to call the person who experiences not pleasure but pain (τὸν μὴ χαίροντα, ἀλγοῦντα δέ) bad while he is in pain (κακὸν εἶναι

τότε ὅταν ἀλγῇ), even if he were the best of all men (ἄριστος πάντων). By contrast, we would have to say of whoever is pleased (τὸν χαίροντα) that the greater his pleasure whenever he is pleased (ὅσῳ μᾶλλον χαίρει, τότε ὅταν χαίρῃ), but more he excels in virtue (τοσούτῳ διαφέρειν πρὸς ἀρετήν!" (quoted from [12]).

In *Philebus* this inference is explicitly consigned to the category of absurd (55c3: ἀλογώτατα) consequences of hedonism, that is, is *itself* seen as an anti-hedonist argument. The absurdity evidently consists in that experiencing pleasure and pain is grounds for a *moral* assessment of people as good or bad. However, the text of *Philebus* does not explain why such an absurd conclusion should be drawn from hedonism. In *Gorgias* the very recognition of people experiencing pleasure as good and those in pain as bad is not presented as something absurd and militates against hedonism only in a mediate form by being part of a more complicated system of argumentation. On the other hand, here it is absolutely clear why in Socrates' opinion, hedonism inevitably leads to such a strange conclusion: it does indeed flow from the hedonistic premises if we simultaneously accept theses (1-2) too.

These theses seem to me to represent a manifestation of the *perfectionist concept of good and evil* which Plato's Socrates upholds in many dialogues, including *Gorgias*. According to that concept *good* for any being is *that which makes him good, and evil is that which makes him bad.*[16] To put it another way, the factors that make something good or bad can be designated as "virtue" (ἀρετή) or "vice"(κακία). The terms "good" and "evil," like the terms "virtue" and "vice," do not have a narrow *moral* meaning. Rather, they make one think of the global *ontological* concept whereby everything that exists can be objectively either in a good and orderly state or objectively in a bad and disorderly state. In the former case it performs its "function" (ἔργον) well and in the latter case badly; accordingly, what leads to a good and orderly state of a being and thus preserves it, is good and virtue and what leads to the opposite state and may ultimately destroy it is evil or vice. Virtue and vice in the narrow moral sense are thought to be varieties of perfectionist good and evil that exist in the case of the soul.[17]

That theses (1-2) really imply the perfectionist concept of good and evil becomes clear if one compares their definition with how Socrates treats this concept further. Socrates couches these theses (1-2) in the following way:

"...Don't you call good men good by the presence of goods, just as you call beautiful those to whom beauty is present? (...τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς οὐχὶ ἀγαθῶν παρουσίᾳ ἀγαθοὺς καλεῖς, ὥσπερ τοὺς καλοὺς οἷς ἂν κάλλος παρῇ;)" (Gorg. 497e1-3);

"You don't know that you say good men are good by the presence of goods, and evil men evil by the presence of evils? (...τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ἀγαθῶν φὴς παρουσίᾳ εἶναι ἀγαθούς, καὶ κακοὺς δὲ κακῶν)" (498d2-3).

Thus *good* is that which *by its presence* (παρουσία) in a subject makes it *good*. But that is an interpretation of good on which Socrates insists in 506cd in clearly separating it from pleasure:

"And the pleasant is that which, if it has come to be present, we take pleasure (Ηδὺ δέ ἐστιν τοῦτο οὗ παραγενομένου ἡδόμεθα), and the good that which, if it

has come to be present, we are good (ἀγαθὸν δὲ οὗ παρόντος ἀγαθοί ἐσμεν)..." (506c9-d2).

Socrates expresses that thesis in a context that makes it possible to effectively equate "good" to the concepts of "virtue" (ἀρετή) or some kind of "order" (κόσμος) which, being present in something that exists, makes it "good":

"Now we are good, and so is anything else which is good, when some virtue has come to be present... (Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀγαθοί γέ ἐσμεν καὶ ἡμεῖς καὶ τἆλλα πάντα ὅσ' ἀγαθά ἐστιν, ἀρετῆς τινος παραγενομένης)... But now, the virtue of each thing (ἥ γε ἀρετὴ ἑκάστου), a tool, a body, and, further, a soul and a whole animal, doesn't come to be present in the best way just at random, but by some structure and correctness and craft (τάξει καὶ ὀρθότητι καὶ τέχνῃ), the one assigned to each of them... Then the virtue of each thing (ἡ ἀρετὴ ἑκάστου) is something structured and ordered (τεταγμένον καὶ κεκοσμημένον) by a structure (τάξει)... Then it is some order (κόσμος τις)—the proper order for each of the things that are (ἐγγενόμενος ἐν ἑκάστῳ ὁ ἑκάστου οἰκεῖος)—which makes the thing good by coming to be present in it (ἀγαθὸν παρέχει ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων)... Then a soul with its own proper order (κόσμον ἔχουσα τὸν ἑαυτῆς) is better than a disordered soul (ἀμείνων τῆς ἀκοσμήτου)..."[18] (506d2-e5).

For those who already share that concept, the term "good" intrinsically means a thing that must possess a *perfectionist function*, that is, what makes somebody or something *good*. Accordingly, if one builds into this perfectionist context the hedonistic thesis that good is pleasure, then pleasure *as* good has to perform a perfectionist function or make the person who experiences it good. This is implicit in *Philebus* and explicit in *Gorgias*. This makes it clear, however, that the absurd thesis whereby people who experience pleasure are good and those who experience pain are bad (10-11) flows not from hedonism as such (9), but from a combination of hedonism and perfectionism (1-2). To avoid that thesis the hedonist simply has to disagree with theses (1-2) and their perfectionist implications. Such a possibility apparently simply does not occur to Plato's Socrates: he takes perfectionism so much for granted that he believes that a hedonist, in identifying good with pleasure, still must think of good as something that makes the thing good. But to be totally consistent a hedonist should not be guided by the perfectionist criteria of good and from the beginning think of it not as "that which makes good" but as "that which makes us feel good" or, as Socrates puts it, "that which, if it has come to be present, we take pleasure [in]." Thus, the second antihedonist thesis of Socrates is conceptually wanting because it is based on the assumption that hedonism invariably implies a perfectionist concept of good, which is not the case.[19]

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Apparently, both Socratic arguments proceed from roughly the same logic: to prove that good is not identical with pleasure one has to take *an existing* formal concept of good that possesses *assumed* characteristics (incompatibility with

evil, perfectionist function) and demonstrate that pleasure does not possess these properties (the first argument) or else that we would arrive at absurd conclusions if we assume that it does possess them (the second argument). All a hedonist has to do to refute such arguments is to put into question the formal concept of good. Good may be identical with pleasure even if pleasure is compatible with pain (although the latter thesis is not necessary) because in the hedonistic perspective recognizing that pleasure is compatible with pain is *tantamount to recognizing* that good and evil are compatible. And pleasure can be good even if it does not make anyone better because for the hedonist good is not "what makes good" but "what makes one feel good."

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Notes

1 I consider totally erroneous hedonistic reinterpretations of Socrates' arguments in *Gorgias* (for example, Gosling-Taylor [7, pp. 75-82]; Berman [1]; Rudebusch [14]), prompted exclusively by the wish to harmonize it with the hedonistic position he sets forth in *Protagoras* (Prot. 351b-358c). However, I cannot dwell on them here in more detail.

2 Thus, his own concept of rhetoric in 464b-465a already implies an antihedonistic separation of good and pleasure (464d1-2, 465a2; cf. 501bc, 513d), and his arguments against Polus in 475a-c separation of evil and pain.

3 The argument separates pleasure and pain both from good and evil as well as happiness and unhappiness considering the two latter pairs of concepts to be interchangeable (as seen in (4) and (10)). This is possible because, like with Plato, and indeed with many ancient authors, *good* or *goods*, however one defines them, are thought of as a factor that makes a person *happy*, and accordingly, *evil* or any of its varieties is a factor that makes a person *unhappy* (cf. Symp. 202c, 204e-205a; Euthyd. 278e-279a, 280b; Alcib. I (sp.). 116b; Meno 77e-78b).

4 TIO is close to the thesis Socrates puts forward in Resp. 436b8-9: "...the same thing will not be willing to do or undergo opposites in the same part of itself, in relation to the same thing, at the same time... (ταὐτὸν τἀναντία ποιεῖν ἢ πάσχειν κατὰ ταὐτόν γε καὶ πρὸς ταὐτὸν οὐκ ἐθελήσει ἅμα)" (quoted from [12]). But there is no mention in *Gorgias* of incompatibility of opposites in one and the same regard.

5 Cf. Robinson [13, p. 40]. As far as I can see, (b) and (c) in his opinion are inductive inferences made on the basis of concrete examples. Cf. reconstruction of the logic of this argument in [10, p. 311; 11, p. 201].

6 Cf. what I think is an interesting parallel in Sext. Adv. Math. X, 264-266, where (a) opposites can be present in one and the same subject only by turns, and never simultaneously, which means incompatibility, (b) health and sickness are cited as an example of incompatibility, and (c) good and evil are treated as opposites. This place is part of an outline of the Pythagorean doctrine (Adv. Math. X, 248-309), where it is apparently presented in its Platonic version (cf. [3, p. 53]).

7 In my view, given such an interpretation, it is more natural to see TIO as a postulate of Socrates which is rather illustrated by some examples in (2-3), than derived from them by induction (contrary to Robinson—see note 5). However, I do not rule out that Plato him-

self did not give enough thought to the relationship between TIO and inductive reasoning which is why it is not very clearly expressed in the text.

8 One notes, for example, that Sext. Adv. Math. X, 266 (see note 6), recognizes as opposites pain and absence of pain, λύπη and ἀλυπία, but not pain and pleasure, λύπη and ἡδονή. Theoretically speaking, this approach makes it possible not to consider pain and pleasure to be opposites, thus explaining their compatibility. Yet even in this case it is not necessary: one can simultaneously consider as opposites pain and absence of pain and pain and pleasure (cf.. Speus. Fr. 80c-e Taran).

9 Plato's Socrates characterizes pleasure and pain as opposites also in Resp. 583c3-4 (cf. [5, p. 310]), Phaed. 60b3-5 (where what is painful is defined as that which seems to be the opposite of what is pleasant), Phil. 41d1-3 (where pleasure and pain are explicitly claimed to be compatible opposites).

10 I am speaking here of "paired concepts" and not of "opposites" to take into account two conceivable variants: in denying TIO Socrates (i) considers pleasure and pain to be opposites or (ii) does not consider them to be opposites. In my opinion, the difference between (i) and (ii) makes no difference to the logic of the Socratic argument: if one denies TIO, one may or may not consider any pair concepts to be opposites, but this has no consequences for determining their own compatibility or incompatibility.

11 Cf. the way Dodds [5, p. 310] challenged Robinson's interpretation: "...Plato does not in fact assert in the present passage that no pair of contraries can belong to a thing simultaneously (though he may be thought to imply it at 495e6-7); nor does he draw the conclusion that pleasure and pain are not contraries. I suspect that he had not at this point thought out the logic of contraries, and did not choose to commit himself. All he seems to do in the Gorgias is to establish the nonidentity of two concepts (Pleasure and Good) by the nonidentity of their marks (capacity in the one case, incapacity in the other, for coexistence with its contrary)." Santas, apparently like Dodds, reduces the Socratic argument to juxtaposing compatible and incompatible pairs of concepts, but in addition, without any explanation claims that the polemic between Dodds and Robinson on whether Socrates considers pleasure and pain to be opposites, arose as a result of inaccurate rendering of the argument of Socrates (see [15, pp. 268, 267-270]).

12 Nor is it obvious that the examples of incompatible pairs of notions cited by Socrates (health and sickness, etc.) presuppose incompatibility (see [17, p. 644]).

13 Cf. [15, p. 269] with regard to the example of thirst and the quenching of thirst. But a hedonist has no need to allow for compatibility of pleasure and pain. Plato's reduction of any need to pain that underpins this assumption (6) is highly problematical (cf. various instances of its critique [6, p. 22; 19, p. 157). In particular, there is no need to describe a need that is already being *satisfied* as pain. If one assumes that as soon as a need begins to be satisfied, pain immediately stops and gives way to pleasure, then pain and pleasure from one and the same need would not be simultaneous, but alternate and pain does not at all become compatible with pleasure. For example, Epicurus maintained that pleasure was incompatible with pain (Epic. Rat. Sent. 3 = D.L.X, 139; Fr. 421 Usener) and he may have done so to challenge Plato's thesis of their compatibility implying that they can be experienced only by turns (this is argued in [2, p. 392-401]).

14 Theoretically Callicles could have given up (3) to preserve (9), but the thing is that his ideal is a "strong" man (483c-484a; 484c; 488b-d) and he considers the virtues that he recognizes to be a manifestation of genuine "strength" (489e-490a; 491ab), whereas adherence to (9) effectively forces him to recognize a coward and a dupe to be a good man (cf. (10-13)), which is obviously at odds with his own ideal.

15 Callicles considers *only* pleasure to be good—not courage or reasonableness (495d4-5), which to him are merely necessary *instruments* of achieving maximum pleasure (491e8-492a3), and only to that extent are *virtues* (492d5-e2; cf. 492c4-6). Proceeding from this he could have denied (5-7), by saying that people who are courageous and reasonable (in achieving pleasure) derive more pleasure, i.e., *good*, than cowardly and unreasonable people (in the same respect) and therefore in fact turn out to be *better* than the latter (cf. [17, p. 646]).

16 Cf. Charm. 160e11-12: "And could a thing be good that does not produce good men?—Of course not (Ἆρ' οὖν ἂν εἴη ἀγαθὸν ὃ μὴ ἀγαθοὺς ἀπεργάζεται; Οὐ δῆτα)" (quoted from [12]); accordingly, in 161a8-9 "temperance" is recognized as good on the grounds that "it makes those good in whom it is present." Cf. Euthyph. 13b7-10, where concern for the good and benefit of horses (ἐπ' ἀγαθῷ τινί ἐστι καὶ ὠφελίᾳ) is concern about making them better (βελτίους γίγνονται). In Resp. 608e-609b evil is similarly defined as that which "makes... bad" (609a6-7: ...πονηρόν τε ποιεῖ ᾧ προσεγένετο; 609b4-5: ...τι ...τῶν ὄντων, ᾧ ἔστι μὲν κακὸν ὃ ποιεῖ αὐτὸ μοχθηρόν).

17 In addition to Gorg. 506c-507a (cf. quotation below), this concept is present in Gorg. 477bc; Men. 87e; Lach. 189e-190c; Resp. 335b-e; 352e-354a; 601d; Leg. 961d; Alc. I (sp.) 133b. Cf. Defin. (sp.) 411d1-2: "Virtue... the state on account of which its possessor is said to be good (Ἀρετὴ... ἕξις καθ' ἣν τὸ ἔχον ἀγαθὸν λέγεται)" (quoted from [12]).

18 Elsewhwere in 506e-507c the presence of inherent order in the soul is the source of traditional moral virtues of temperance, piety, justice and courage.

19 A similar argument was later used by the Stoics who also express perfectionist concepts of good and evil (Cf. SVF III, 80: "Stoics... claim that 'any good makes [people] good'" (πᾶν, φασί, τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἀγαθοὺς ποιεῖ); accordingly, only that is evil for man which makes him worse, cf. Sen. Epist. 85, 30-32; Marc. Aur. 2, 11; 4, 8; 10, 33). They used this concept to deny non-moral goods: "What is good makes people good (quod bonum est bonos facit); (for in music too what is good makes a person musical); chance things do not make a person good; therefore they are not good (fortuita bonum non faciunt; ergo non sunt bona)" (Sen. Epist. 87, 12; quoted from [16]; cf. also Cic. Par. stoic. 1, 3, where a similar argument is applied to pleasure). That, however, is only true if one assumes a priori that "chance things" (or traditional non-moral goods) had to be good precisely in the perfectionist sense, which is anything but self-evident.

Translated by Yevgeny Filippov