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и
современная философия

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«Трактат о человеческой природе» Юма был «попыткой применить основанный на опыте метод рассуждения к моральным предметам». Его цель заключалась в разработке всесторонней «науки о человеке» или «человеческой природе». Естественным результатом напряженного философского размышления, которое сначала привело к «чрезмерному» или «пирронову» скептическому затруднению является рекомендуемый Юмом «смягченный скептицизм». Неизбежность, с которой пытливый мыслитель сначала приходит к катастрофе, происходит из принятия «разума» в качестве отличительного основания человеческой природы. Неизбежность, с которой тот же самый человек, в конечном счете, освобождается от «скептического» затруднения, происходит исключительно из самой «природы». Оба движения мысли являются обязательными для достижения наилучшего состояния для человека. Таким образом, существует подход, согласно которому «скептицизм» и «натурализм» вместе оказываются центральными для Юмовского понимания человеческой природы и его понятия полной и специфически человеческой жизни. По Юму, именно следование за «наукой о человеке» предлагаемым им способом позволит нам достичь наиболее согласованного состояния.

Hume's Treatise of Human Nature was "An Attempt to introduce the experimental Method of Reasoning into moral subjects". The goal was a comprehensive "science of man" or "of human nature" that would reveal "the extent and force of human understanding, and . . . explain the nature of the ideas we employ, and of the operations we perform in our reasonings". Human beings and every aspect of their lives were to be studied as parts of nature and understood solely in terms of what can be found out about them through the use of whatever capacities human beings are naturally endowed with for finding out about anything.

That comprehensive project could be called a form of "naturalism". It takes nothing for granted that cannot be found in nature and relies only on procedures whose reliability can be tested by their observable results. Nothing more would be required for the proper study of animals and animal life, for instance, and Hume had the parallel explicitly in mind. That is not to deny or minimize the great differences between human beings and the other animals. What makes the "science of human nature" of special interest and importance for us are all the ways in which way human beings are distinctive.

Human beings are unique in possessing and deploying an elaborate body of thoughts and beliefs and knowledge about the world they live in. The task for Hume was therefore to explain, among other things, how human beings get those thoughts and beliefs and knowledge about the world. He started with what he thought human beings as thinkers and potential knowers start with: what they perceive in sense-experience. And Hume thought perceivers never strictly speaking perceive how things are in the world they live in. The most they get from the world are fleeting and momentary impressions in which what they are aware of implies nothing about how things are in the world beyond. From these materials alone, Hume thought, human beings construct their elaborate conception of the world and their place in it. "Nature" is present in this process in the form of certain general "principles of association" or "principles of the imagination" according to which perceptions and their effects naturally come and go in human minds. That is simply part of the way things are in nature, and not further explained.

Hume came to see that the fact that human beings receive nothing more than fleeting, momentary impressions from the world leaves us all in a deeply unsatisfactory position. It means that we can never understand ourselves as having any reason to believe any of the things we do believe about the world around us. And it means that Hume himself could not even find himself with reason to believe the very 'results' he thought he had arrived at in his "science of human nature". The unfortunate position all of us are left in is often called "scepticism", and Hume himself sometimes calls it that.

But having argued at length and with great force that we are all in that "sceptical" position, Hume saw and felt the hopelessness of understanding ourselves in that way. He despaired of ever escaping from that plight, but he did eventually manage to escape the despair. Not by showing that we are not really in the unsatisfactory position he had proved we are in, but by overcoming the feelings of hopelessness that his discoveries had led him into. The more agreeable outcome he achieved is also a form of what Hume calls "scepticism". It is a deeper and more consequential condition or state of mind that Hume describes and endorses. But he thinks that more enlightened state becomes available to us only by our first passing through the earlier "sceptical" disaster that his "science of man" inevitably leads to.

What Hume discovers and stresses is that we simply cannot continue to believe the negative "sceptical" conclusions we admit we cannot avoid reaching in philosophy. As he puts it:

Most fortunately it happens, that since reason is incapable of dispelling these clouds, nature herself suffices to that purpose, and cures me of this philosophical melancholy and delirium ... [1]

[1] Hume D. A Treatise of Human Nature (ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge). Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1958. P. 269.

This is an appeal to the force of "nature" over "reason". Trying to follow "reason" leads inevitably to scepticism. But "Nature breaks the force of all sceptical arguments in time, and keeps them from having any considerable influence on the understanding". As a result Hume finds himself "absolutely and necessarily determin'd to live, and talk, and act like other people in the common affairs of life".

In "this blind submission" to the forces of nature, Hume says, "I shew most perfectly my sceptical disposition and principles". The kind of "scepticism" he endorses is achieved not by reflection alone but by the forces of nature operating on the otherwise disastrous results of earlier philosophical reflections. It is "scepticism" in the sense of those sceptics of antiquity who were said to have achieved a contented, tranquil way of life by having overcome an obsession with reason and truth and simply going along with their natural inclinations. Hume thinks "nature" can have this kind of liberating effect only on those who have first engaged in philosophical reflections about human nature and found themselves in the disastrous "sceptical" plight he first reached. The "excessive", paralyzing effects of those earlier "sceptical" reflections are "mitigated" by the superior force of certain natural human instincts. It is not an outcome that can be achieved by reasoning and reflection alone. We can see and fully appreciate the superior force of "nature" over "reason" only by finding ourselves inevitably believing and acting in precisely the ways that our "sceptical" philosophical reflections convince us we have no good reason to do.

This "mitigated scepticism" is a condition or state of mind that Hume regards not only as the most agreeable outcome of philosophical reflection but also as the best way to live. It can be called a "sceptical" state or stance, but it is a purely natural result of philosophical reflections that lead in themselves to an "excessive" or "Pyrrhonist" "sceptical" conclusion. The inevitability with which the curious human thinker is first driven into that disaster comes from the acceptance of "reason" as the distinctive foundation of human nature. The inevitability with which that same human being is eventually freed from that "sceptical" quandary comes from "nature" alone. Both movements of thought are essential for achieving the best human outcome. So there is a way in which both "scepticism" and "naturalism" are central to Hume's understanding of human nature and of a full and distinctively human life. Pursuing the "science of man" in the way he proposes is what he thinks will bring this most agreeable human condition home to us.

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Hume on Passions and Value
Юм о страстях и ценности

В статье осуществляется анализ теории причин действия, сформировавшейся в современном юмианстве, прежде всего, в результате интерпретации части 2.3.3. Трактата «О влияющих мотивах воли». У Юма рациональные побудительные причины действия совершенно зависимы от желания или других состояний воли того, кто действует; такие состояния отличны от убеждений и не черпают происхождение из рационального рассуждения. Один из способов спасти практические причины действия предлагает «ценностное» или «перспективистское» юмианство, постулирующее, что мы преследуем не те цели, которые обусловлены нашими желаниями или состояниями воли, а те, которые мы ценим, то есть ценности представляют здесь своего рода подмножество множества наших желаний, отличающееся большей связностью. Автор предлагает новый взгляд на источник нормативности ценностей, в соответствии с которым власть ценностей создавать разумную причину для действия происходит не из связности или последовательности подмножества желаний, а от той перспективы, с которой мы смотрим на наши желания, когда пытаемся определить, которые из них в действительности отражают ценные для нас вещи.

Hume's arguments in *Treatise* 2.3.3, "Of the influencing motives of the will," are the inspiration for the contemporary Humean theory of reasons for action. This is so, despite the fact that in his account of the passions Hume offers a theory of motivation, not a theory of practical reasons. At the heart of Humeanism about practical reason is the notion that reasons for action are ultimately dependent upon the desiring or conative states of an agent, where such states are distinct from beliefs, and do not originate in reasoning. So the Humean view prompts questions about the extent to which reason plays a role in the justification of ends set by desiring or conative states. Humeans have been plagued by a fundamental objection: if a person has no rational justification for her ends, she cannot have reason to take the means to her ends; so, there are no practical reasons whatsoever. If the Humean responds that one's ends themselves give one reasons for acting, then Humeanism seems to imply that *all* motivating states, whether they be desires, impulses, whims, valuations, or some other type of conation, are bases of reasons for action.

Consequently, Humeans face a famous dilemma: either there are no practical reasons at all, or there are reasons to do any actions that achieve the goals of conations of any sort. The latter horn of the dilemma sounds like a denial of rational constraints altogether, and so, by some lights, comes to the same as the former.

One strategy offered in the current literature to deal with this dilemma is sometimes called "value-based" or "perspective-based" Humeanism. It says that we have reason to pursue not the goals of just any desires or conations we happen to have, but the goals that we value, where values are reflected in some subset of our desires. Of course, if our values are represented in a subset of our desires, then the Humean has to explain why these particular desires are normative, or representative of values, when others are not. In general, defenders of the view focus on the formal features of some collection of desires, like their coherence, to account for their normativity. The point is that the content of the desires cannot be evaluated by some standard outside of the desires themselves. This is so because the point of Humeanism is to show how, on a naturalistic view of reason, practical reasons are internal.

In this essay, I sketch a new account of the source of the normativity of values that is more persuasive than the widely accepted coherence-view. My general thesis here is that the reason-giving authority of our values derives, not from the coherence or consistency of the subset of desires that grounds them (as is often alleged), but from the features of the perspective we take on our desires, when we attempt to discover which of them actually reflect what we value. I see this approach to normativity as one inspired by, and found in, Hume's *Treatise*. Although Hume is the progenitor of the Humean view, he is rarely discussed in defenses of Humeanism. Perhaps this is because Hume is frequently seen as a skeptic about practical reasoning—that is, as denying that reason in itself functions to guide action.

In this paper, I argue that the perspective from which we naturally deliberate about and approve of our desires or conations is not a subjective or idiosyncratic one, but is instead a shared, or, in-principle, public one. Inter-subjectivity is a feature distinctive of the general or common point of view that Hume invokes in his account of moral judgment. This perspective is normative because, in it, we step away from our positions as agents susceptible to the strength or intensity of our feelings, and instead, as surveyors of our own desires, bring qualitative considerations to bear on them. These are considerations—such as how my life will go if I seek fulfillment of this desire over that one—that all normally-reflective persons contemplate when they decide what they most care about.

Details of the Argument

The Humean theory of motivation, which alleges that an agent's having a motive to act for an end necessarily depends upon that agent's having a desiring state for that end, is often depicted as a theory of reasons for action. For Hume, however, it is important to distinguish reference to reasons from reference to motives. Motives for Hume are causes or potential causes of actions. So, Hume does not explicitly offer a theory of reasons for action, where reasons provide some kind of practical justification for the action. He never claims that the presence of a desire gives the agent a reason to act, or that a belief-desire pair constitutes a reason for action. He does say that reason by itself does not produce motives; that some of our motivating passions are "original instincts"; and that some arise when an aversion or propensity is created by the prospect of pleasure or pain from an object. These sorts of assertions are the warrant for tracing to Hume the contemporary Humean theory of motivation, where having a reason for action depends on possession of a desire that itself is not originated by reason.

But the contemporary Humean view is not identical to Hume's. Contemporary Humeans want a theory of desire-based *reasons* for action. In response to the dilemma posed by critics (that since ends or desires are not justified, either there are no practical reasons, or there are reasons to do anything one desires), some Humeans have thought it important to show that Humeanism *can* justify certain intrinsic desires (desires for ultimate ends). This is usually done by reference to coherence.

I have doubts about the adequacy of the coherence view. This view invites the question whether the standard of rationality invoked actually adheres to the Humean notion that reasons depend on the subjective, motivating states of an agent. This is because it makes the test of practical rationality consist in features like coherence and "informedness" of desires. Having a reason for action on this view does not require the approval or assent of the agent to the particular rational desire or to the network of desires to which it belongs. If practical rationality consists in acting on desires that exhibit a certain feature that only some of one's desires exhibit, then normativity derives, it seems, from that feature, whatever that feature may be, rather than from the conative states of the actor.

Furthermore, if the coherence and stability of desires were to constitute the entire account of Humean normativity, then the rationalist critic would not be content. For there are conceivably many sets of consistent and internally coherent ends. The Humean coherentist might respond to the critic that such desires could be part of a coherent psychological network only if that network also includes false or unjustified beliefs. Such beliefs would be undermined by standards of theoretical reason and so we needn't worry that, according to the coherentist, strange conations

would pass the justification test. However, the Humean who subscribes to coherentist standards of practical norms either subscribes also to coherentist norms of theoretical reason, or she does not. For the Humean who is coherentist on both counts, it isn't necessarily the case that conations with aberrant goals will be unjustified. If a particular person's beliefs and desires fit together as a network of mutually supporting psychological states, they would be considered rational, no matter their content. On the other hand, if the Humean coherentist about practical reason is a non-coherentist (some kind of foundationalist) about belief justification, then perhaps she could make the argument that aberrant desires *can* be discounted as irrational: that they can be discounted on the grounds that they are based on irrational beliefs. For the Humean, however, these desires are not dependent only on beliefs; they are derived from beliefs along with intrinsic, or original, desires. But if that original desire coheres with other desires one has, as it surely does, then one has reason to act on that original desire. So, the derived desire is based on a rational desire (one that coheres with other desires) and an irrational belief. But then it looks as though incoherence of *desires* is doing no work in discounting certain desires. The work is done by irrational belief.

I want to suggest that, by appealing to Hume, there is more that Humeans can say about practical norms than what is offered by coherence accounts. A rationalist analysis of normativity strikes many anti-Humeans as proper because, just as reason can evaluate specific beliefs as justified or unjustified relative to a rational notion of good evidence, it seems plausible that reason can designate specific ends as justified, or not, relative to a rational notion of goodness or rightness. The Humean line, however, can also formulate norms for better and worse belief by looking at the natural process of belief formation. So, why can't the Humean also look to the natural process of judgment, or reflection, to formulate norms for value formation? This is the point where we can take cues from Hume himself, whose theories have often been accused, mistakenly I think, of lacking an account of normativity.

The Humean can offer a Hume-inspired account of the normativity of practical judgments. After Hume argues that our moral distinctions are derived from sentiments, he describes the manner in which sentiments produce our judgments of people's characters. Our approvals or disapprovals (pro- and con-attitudes) towards others' characters are produced by a natural sympathy we have with the feelings of persons affected by them. As individuals, our natural sympathies are also affected by our proximity to people in space and time, and by our personal connections to them: we feel more strongly, for example, about the accomplishments of friends or loved ones, than we do about similar acts of strangers. Yet, our judgments of the quality of each of their characters

based on those particular accomplishments are the same. Hume explains these judgments, which may deviate from our initial natural feelings, as the result of our taking up a certain perspective to correct for the variations that cause discrepancies in basic value judgments. We adopt what he calls a "general" or "common" point of view. In judging the value of character traits, we judge the traits and the effects of the actions they produce, not according to our particular interests and situations relative to the agent under consideration, but from a point of view others can occupy as well. We react to characters from a common point of view, which is to say that we each respond using the same approach, namely, in sympathy with the feelings of the people closest to the agent being judged, rather than by giving credence to our personal or idiosyncratic feelings. Among the traits of others we judge in this way are virtues and vices like gratitude and ingratitude, benevolence and malice, but also the virtue of prudence, or acting for one's long-term happiness.

But how does Hume's account of moral judgment bear on an account of personal deliberation about desires and standards that apply to it? To consider deliberatively our desires and their value to us, we respond to them in light of such matters as their effects on our lives in the long run, and their consequences for people around us or for people we care about, without regard to how strong those desires press us in the moment. From our responses, which are qualitative assessments, come our desires about our desires. This is not to say that everyone responds to every instance of conflicting desires or values in exactly the same way. My claim is that the deliberative process has a certain structure, just as Hume's general point of view has, such that all who engage in reflection on their desires roughly follow it.

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Эпистемологические парадоксы Юма
Hume's Epistemological Paradoxes

В статье анализируются взгляды Дэвида Юма, относящиеся к области эпистемологии, философии языка и сознания (природа знания и сознания, значение, причинности, индукция, природа философского знания) и широко обсуждаемые в современной аналитической философии. Показывается, что особенность Юмовского подхода состоит в парадоксальном характере проблематизации главных философских проблем. Сам Юм

вполне осознавал парадоксальность своих основных утверждений и нередко использовал термин «парадокс». Рассматриваются парадоксы когнитивной реальности, эмпирической необходимости, экстерналистского значения, индуктивного обоснования, естественной ментальности, скептического теоретизирования. Последний воплощает в себе, помимо всего, самую суть подлинного философского дискурса, а именно, его критический и проблематизирующий характер, предвосхищающий некоторые современные подходы (Витгенштейн, Фейерабенд, Рорти, французский постмодернизм).

I will venture to present Hume's epistemological insights in the form of six paradoxes.

The following paradoxes will be considered here: the paradox of cognitive reality; the paradox of empirical necessity; the paradox of externalist meaning; the paradox of inductive validity; the paradox of natural mentality; the paradox of skeptical theorizing.

The paradox of cognitive reality

Hume's observations of individual consciousness uncover two basic cognitive phenomena which exhaust the entire content of knowledge: impressions and ideas. The first ones represent the primary reality of the mind, but they can hardly be recognized as knowledge according to the famous presupposition which Hume shares with Berkeley: "senses know nothing". As for ideas they present weaker copies of impressions or their combinations. So knowledge in the form of ideas never contains anything new in comparison with impressions, and it is meaningless to speak about the process of cognition in terms of accumulation of knowledge, or in terms of a transition from ignorance to knowledge.

Thus impression is not knowledge according to its source while an idea does not embody knowledge according to its content and development. And the paradox receives the following form: *"the only real thing is knowledge but knowledge is not real"*.

The paradox of empirical necessity

Where are the roots of the notion of causality to be found – in impressions or in ideas? Causality presupposed necessity of some kind; and if we have an idea of necessity it must arise as every idea from some impression. And nevertheless, "there is no impression convey'd by our senses, which can give rise to that idea… Either we have no idea of necessity, or necessity is nothing that determination of the thought to pass from causes to effects and from effects to causes, according to their experienc'd union"[1].

Hume evidently accepts the notion of *logical necessity* that is an ability to think of ideas as necessarily connected to each other. At the same time *natural necessity* is understood as an

[1]Hume, David, A Treatise of Human Nature, 2 vols., eds. D.F. Norton and M.J. Norton, Oxford 2007, 1.3.14.22-23.

inclination of thought to connect ideas: custom, imagination or whatever allows our mind to combine, to manipulate with ideas either arbitrarily or regularly dependant on our sensual impulse. Necessity as a purely a priori idea because of its logical form is opposed to necessity as being given only in experience, in a posteriori form – so the paradox of empirical necessity arises.

The paradox of externalist meaning

Is meaning produced by the inner activity of imagination, association of ideas, in short, by thinking itself or is it determined by external experience, a set of impressions, custom? There are sufficient reasons for both accounts in Hume's works.

As Hume mentions, «...the sense of interest has become common to all our fellows, and gives us a confidence of the future regularity of their conduct: And 'tis only on the expectation of this, that our moderation and abstinence are founded. In like manner are languages gradually establish'd by human conventions without any promise"[1]. Hume then develops an idea of language origin in the context of social community and finds its roots in economical exchange and property relations.

Hume's alternative account of language is based on a specific distinction between impressions and ideas, memory and imagination: «As 'tis certain there is a great difference betwixt the simple conception of the existence of an object, and the belief of it, and as this difference lies not in the parts or composition of the idea, which we conceive; it follows, that it must lie in the manner, in which we conceive it»[2]. The way of thinking does not affect the content of thought, its meaning – this is Hume's argument in favor of the substantialist interpretation of meaning.

Thus as soon as both substantialist and functionalist interpretations of Hume's account have their reasons, the paradox of externalist meaning appears: meaning is *necessarily given* to the mind through isolated impressions and ideas introspectively observed; and at the same time it is *probabilistically produced* due to the changeable use of words in context.

The paradox of inductive validity

Is thinking a kind of calculating activity governed solely by the standards of formal logic and accordingly evaluated by those standards of rationality? Or it is rather a development, learning, the graduate conceptualization of the process of the complex mastering the world using, besides notions and syllogisms, also trial and errors, imagination and intuition, analogy and metaphors? This was originally Hume's problem, which has been later dubbed "Hume's guillotine"[3]: an

[1] A Treatise on Human Nature 3.2.2.11.
[2] A Treatise on Human Nature, 1.3.7.2-3.
[3]See: Black, Max, "The Gap Between 'Is' and 'Should'" // The Philosophical Review, 73 (1964): 165-181.

inescapable poverty of inductive inference yet in the absence of any other cognitive means of empirically valuable judgment.

What mostly strikes Hume is that our abstract ideas including virtues could never be directly derived from experience: "there is a direct and total opposition betwixt our reason and our senses"[1]. And even if not every complex idea is a general or abstract one, it concerns especially the latter when "I observe, that many of our complex ideas never had impressions, that corresponded to them, and that many of our complex impressions never are exactly copied in ideas"[2].

If we can never infer from reiteration of the past impressions to their regular appearance in the future either in memory or in imagination, then we can hardly form any abstract idea connected with a set of impressions as a rule of their summarized and joint presentation. What does Hume means by saying that an abstract idea represents (means) a set of single impressions (objects)? The idea is only applied as if it were universal by using words though the question still remains: how can single word (an impression of sound) represent a set of other impressions? To shift the problem of abstraction to the problem of denotation does not evidently mean to solve it. What is missing here are the concepts "learning" and "history" instead of "meaning" and "inference". An abstract idea will never be a representative of a perceptual variety unless the former itself becomes an outcome of the learning history of a person having gradually mastered a number of empirical situations.

So inductive validity as a requirement of abstract reasoning is unattainable; and yet our inductive reasoning is the only access we have to empirically valuable knowledge.

The paradox of natural mentality

«In short there are two principles, which I cannot render consistent; nor is it in my power to renounce either of them, viz. *that all our distinct perceptions are distinct existences,* and *that the mind never perceives any real connexion among distinct existences*». This Hume's conclusion at the end of the *Treatise* reveals one of the basic difficulties: the impossibility of drawing together the immediate perception of distinct impressions and the observation of how they are combined or connected to each other. The given, the primary mental data, and the activity which creates them are things essentially hard to unite. Or in other words, the natural roots of consciousness are incompatible with its functioning in the human mind. And without it the picture of consciousness remains fragmentary and contradictory, especially in terms of the rejection of spiritual substance and the thinking self.

[1] A Treatise on Human Nature, 1.4.4.15.
[2] A Treatise on Human Nature, 1.1.1.4-5.

So consciousness is a natural phenomenon but its functioning does not follow from its nature – this is a core of Hume's fifth paradox.

The paradox of skeptical theorizing

Is philosophy based upon positive knowledge or limited by a skeptical criticism? Can two positions usually called "naturalism" ("realism", "dogmatism") and "skepticism" ("rationalism") be combined?

Theoretical thinking is positive and skeptical at the same time – this is the essence of Hume's sixth paradox. He announces his research purpose using such terms as "system" and "foundation" with predicates like "complete" and "solid". But at the end of his enterprise he seems to come to entirely different conclusions. Does this simply mean Hume's disappointment as it concerns any positive philosophy?

Hume gives a rational justification for both naturalism and skepticism. Even more, they appear not only as two different sides of the same coin but as a continuation of each other: "the sceptical and dogmatical reasons are of the same kind, tho' contrary in their operation and tendency; so that where the latter is strong, it has an enemy of equal force in the former to encounter; and as their forces were at first equal, they still continue so, as long as either of them subsists; nor does one of them lose any force in the contest, without taking as much from its antagonist"[1].

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Surpassing the «Ancients» – Liberalism and Modernity in Hume
Превосходя «классиков»: либерализм и современность у Юма

Автор сопоставляет двух мыслителей и друзей – Дэвида Юма и Адама Фергюсона, сходных своей принадлежностью к Шотландскому Просвещению, интересом к моральной проблематике и попытками объяснить социальный прогресс. Как Юм, так и Фергюсон, являясь представителями классического гуманизма, обладают исчерпывающими познаниями в античной письменной культуре. Однако, в отличие от Фергюсона, Юм оказывается способен пойти дальше классической этики, историографии и критики религии, развив ту область философии, которой античности недоставало – эпистемологию, «философское вероятностное рассуждение». Взяв лучшее от античной

[1] A Treatise on Human Nature, 1.4.2.1.

мысли, Юм освободился от ее диктата, что позволило ему, в том числе, оценить «изобилие» и «величие» возможностей, открывающихся с коммерциализацией и развитием предпринимательства в европейском обществе.

Hume is an advocate of liberalism and modernity. Historians of philosophy may think this a bold claim. Yet there is a highly economical way of substantiating it – by focussing on Hume's critique of classical humanism, a politico-philosophical orientation that is deeply rooted in ancient and Renaissance literature, but also foreshadows important preoccupations in the writings of Rousseau and Hegel. Adam Ferguson appears to be a major, albeit somewhat belated representative of classical humanism. As both Ferguson and Hume belong the Scottish Enlightenment, it is quite easy to find common ground between them. Both are moralists, in Basil Willey's sense of the term, and interested in explaining social progress. Both are widely read in ancient literature. Yet, whereas Hume's History of England endorses the view, already expressed in an earlier essay, that industry, knowledge, and humanity are "linked together by an indissoluble chain", his friend and erstwhile protege Ferguson favours a polity founded on "virtue". Though Ferguson thinks highly of the entrepreneurial spirit of the merchant class, he adheres to a concept of liberty which not only antedates liberalism but also anticipates later criticisms of the Enlightenment. Before he took up teaching first natural and then moral philosophy at Edinburgh, holding a post Hume had previously failed to obtain, he had been, among other things, a Presbyterian army chaplain. In this capacity, he had participated in the Austrian War of Succession, a campaign fought to enforce the Pragmatic Sanction. Not surprisingly, the author of a highly tendentious history of republican Rome tended to distrust pure scholarship. The beauties of ancient literature, which he was sufficiently qualified to appreciate, were, according to him, "taken from the living impressions of an active life". His Essay on the History of Civil Society betrays an interest in political and military conflicts that is not of a bookish kind. Ferguson advocated a Scottish militia. Yet the way in which he extolled the ancient virtues and thereby, arguably, provided a basis for the rejection of eighteenth-century cosmopolitanism, clearly is a literary phenomenon. As an Enlightenment thinker, he was bound to be a classicist.

In my paper, I shall argue that Hume sees through the contradictions of a position which, for all its denigration of (classical) learning, reveals itself to be heavily indebted to ancient diatribes against luxury. Apart from his advocacy of philosophical probable

reasoning, it is Hume's mature historical consciousness which, by imitating and surpassing classical models, allows him to prefer the "opulence" and "grandeur" of maritime commercial powers to republican austerity. Taken from the Essay "Of Civil Liberty", these laudatory epithets refer to the achievements of seventeenth-century England and Holland, which for the first time "instructed mankind in the importance of an extensive commerce". Ever since trade has been a political issue. Hume's essay is an ingenious piece of tentative, experimental writing that challenges a variety of assumptions a writer belonging to the tradition of civic humanism would have taken for granted. Moreover, by also arguing as a cautious Francophile, Hume reveals a bias a civic humanist must have found extremely annoying as it runs counter to the latter's belief in the moral depravity of absolute monarchy. His Francophilia notwithstanding, Hume is, of course, an apologist of English constitutional history. And so is Ferguson though the latter's political rhetoric is markedly different. Unlike Ferguson, Hume would never have equated England with Rome, two commonwealths which, according to Ferguson, "… under their mixed governments, the one inclining to democracy, the other to monarchy, have proved the great legislators among nations." The latter has even "carried the authority and government of law to a point of perfection, which they never before attained in the history of mankind." Such superlative praise of the fabric of the English constitution can also be found in Hume's History where we read about "the most entire system of liberty, that ever was known amongst mankind" or, alternatively, "the most accurate system of liberty that was ever found compatible with government."

Hume is a staunch defender of the constitutional arrangements of 1688 and its aftermath. Yet, unlike Ferguson, he does not dispense formulaic wisdom, derived from Aristotle or Polybios, about "governments properly mixed". Both Hume and Ferguson are obsessed with political stability, the idea of a society which has found its permanent mould. At the same time they show themselves dedicated to the task of conceptualising and explaining change. It is here where they part company. When Hayden White suggests that Hume conceived of history as "the eternal return of the same folly" so that he finally became "bored with history as he had become bored with philosophy", he could not be further from the truth. His dismissive comment betrays a preference for the grand historical narratives of the nineteenth century. Neither does Hume share the ironical stance of Jacob Burckhardt, the Swiss historian, whose analysis of the encroachment of modern culture upon the spheres of politics and religion helped him to the distinction of

being treated as one of the four major "historical realists" in Metahistory, The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-century Europe. Though there is nothing wrong with calling both Hume and Ferguson conservatives, only the latter can be found questioning the benefits of a civilisation founded on commerce and the "separation of professions" rather than virtue. In Hume's History, the ironic mode exposes what he saw as the disreputable origins of eighteenth-century civil society and, to a lesser extent, the precariousness of its foundations.

Though Hume shows himself able to appreciate medieval culture in a way Voltaire does not and finds words of praise for Elizabeth and the early Stuart reigns, he is thoroughly pessimistic about the past. Bent upon proving wrong the myths propagated about the Ancient Constitution, Tudor England, or the Puritan Revolution, his greatest enemy is the false consciousness produced by the Whig interpretation of history. To unmask it as a delusion, more is required than to have read the classics, indispensable though they are. Unlike Hobbes, Hume does not dismiss the ancients as either irrelevant or dangerous. In order to surpass them, you have to engage with their writings in a constructive dialogue – be it in ethics, religion, or history. Though Hume appears to be deliberately underawed when he discusses the material basis of their culture (in "Of the Populousness of Ancient Nations", he turns the tables on the detractors of modern civilisation in the field of demography), he faces a formidable task. Even a philosophical tyro has to acknowledge that Cicero's De Officiis is superior to The Whole Duty of Man or any other work of devotional literature. The Dialogues concerning Natural Religion, Hume's critique of deism, belong to the hybrid genre of an original imitation. In The Natural History of Religion, Hume undertakes a study of the aetiology of popular religion – to become its modern Pliny. The History of England represents a genre in which Hume's countryman Hugh Blair, in his Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres, found the moderns particularly wanting – until the advent of Hume, Robertson, and Gibbon. Yet there is a discipline in which the ancients failed pitifully: epistemology. And epistemology or 'philosophical probable reasoning' proved to be the tool Hume needed most if he wanted to surpass the ancients – in morals, in his critique of religion, and even in historiography. That is why we read in the introduction to the Treatise that "[t]here is no question of importance, whose decision is not compriz'd in the science of man". And why, after the failure of the Treatise to attract a large readership, Hume, in the first Enquiry, is insistent that we "must cultivate true metaphysics with some care"

in order to get rid of the "false and adulterate". Hume, I wish to maintain against scholars like Donald Livingston and Adam Potkay, is much more than a Ciceronian humanist or an eighteenth-century Livy. This may be difficult to understand if we allow ourselves to be either intrigued or put off by his scepticism, that is to say, by a Pyrrhonian misreading of his sceptical arguments about causation, personal identity, and the continued existence of external objects. Thus, what really separates the two thinkers, and Hume's dislike of Ferguson's Essay is well attested, are their radically different approaches to the classics. Hume's early essay on Robert Walpole notwithstanding, he is not enthralled by the spectre of corruption, the entropic vision of history, which takes the inevitable decline of every polity for granted and which can be traced back to Machiavelli's Discourses on the first ten books of Livy's history of Rome as its ultimate source. What is the point of listening to such prophecies of decay which had bedevilled European intellectuals far too long, he seems to ask?

Even so, Peter Gay, who saw the Enlightenment culminate in Hume's works, dubbed him a complete modern pagan. It is true that Hume uses the ethical thinking of the ancients to get rid of an ethos of self-abnegation based on the idea of life as a pilgrimage, Cicero's De Natura Deorum to challenge teleological or providential arguments, and Tacitus for the drawing of characters. But as an epistemologist and as a historian who is very much aware of unintended consequences, he moves beyond them. (They were of no use when it came to understanding how religious enthusiasm, the Puritan 'frenzy', worked as a catalyst in the history of liberty.) Ferguson, the Presbyterian minister and moral philosopher, could never have availed himself of the ancients in such a way. That is why he never got free of them and why he never could have celebrated Britain as a commercial power that had as little need of a militia as it had of a large standing army. He criticises his contemporaries because he is incapable of a critical approach to history, in particular the Puritan revolution. We may safely assume that a mild dose of Humean irony would have dispelled Ferguson's deepest fears.

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Hume, Kant and the Copernican Revolution
Юм, Кант и Коперниканский переворот

Статья посвящена кантовскому ответу на критику причинности Юма. Сложность анализа данной темы заключается, однако же, в том, что существуют серьезные расхождения как в трактовке позиции по этому вопросу Юма (например, логических позитивистов vs. скептических реалистов), так и Канта (интерпретация «двух миров» vs. понимание мира явлений и реальности как двух сторон одного и того же) самих по себе. Автор заявляет, что для адекватного понимания позиции Канта в отношении теории причинности Юма необходимо обратиться к его Коперниканскому перевороту, который заключается в утверждении, что поскольку явления должны соответствовать структуре познания, мы можем знать лишь то, что сами «конструируем». Стремясь преодолеть «психологизм» Юма, Кант впадает в другую крайность – трансцендентализм, в результате создавая более бедную систему, нежели юмовская.

This paper concerns Kant's response to Hume against the background of the Copernican revolution. Kant held Hume in great esteem. In a letter to Herder, his former student, Kant strikingly says Montaigne occupies the lowest place and Hume the highest. Kant's interest in Hume is woven throughout his corpus, including his pre-critical writings. Kant is concerned with Hume in all three Critiques, and in other texts, including the Prolegomena, the Groundwork, and, according to observers, in such pre-critical writings as the Attempt to Introduce the Concept of Negative Magnitudes into Philosophy (1763) and Dreams of a Spirit-Seer Explained by Dreams of Metaphysics (1766). Hume raised many themes that were important for Kant. These include the independence of reason (that for Hume was a slave to the passions), the possibility of metaphysical, or a priori knowledge of the soul, knowledge of God, and the nature and limits of causation. Kant reacts to Hume on different levels, including at a minimum the theme of causality in the first Critique, the problem of moral freedom in the second Critique, the question of universal principles in the third Critique, and so on.

This paper will concentrate on Kant's reply to Hume's criticism of causality. Kant famously suggests, in the claim that Hume woke him from his dogmatic slumber, that Hume motivates the formulation of the critical philosophy, which was created at least in part to solve

Kant's perception of a difficulty stemming from Hume's attack on causality. This remark implies a distinction between Kant's critical and pre-critical periods, or a period in which he did not understand that and certainly how he needed to respond to Hume, and later period in which he did understand that and, after he formulated the critical philosophy, how he needed to answer Hume.

A grasp of Kant's response to Hume is complicated. In spite of the immense literature, neither Hume's view of causality nor Kant's rival view are well understood. There is for instance controversy about even the basic outlines of Kant's position. One currently popular interpretation suggests Kant holds a double aspect theory in which appearance and reality are two sides of the same thing. This interpretation is countered in the debate by the so-called two worlds interpretation. Both readings find support in the texts.

There is further uncertainty about the relation of Hume's and Kant's views of causality. Hume's view of causality is also unclear. Some observers detect two or three basic ways to read the view including most prominently perhaps the logical positivist and the skeptical realist interpretations. According to the former interpretation, Hume analyzes causal propositions, such as A caused B, in terms of regularities in perception. Hume writes in the Treatise that "power and necessity... are... qualities of perceptions, not of objects... felt by the soul and not perceived externally in bodies." According to skeptical realists, Hume thinks that causation surpasses mere regular succession since there is a necessary connection in a causal sequence.

Numerous recent commentators believe Hume's and Kant's views of causality are not incompatible, but rather compatible. Yet Kant certainly thought the two views were incompatible and went to great lengths to demonstrate the proper solution to the problem in his open left unresolved by Hume.

We do not know when Kant first became acquainted with Hume's writings. Until now it has been assumed he did not read English and depended on translations, though at least one recent study indicates he was closely familiar with Milton's English texts. The importance of this point is not yet clear.

Kant was concerned with Hume over many years. In early writings Kant seems to have been closer to Hume's view of causality that he later strongly criticized. Scholars detect pre-critical efforts to come to grips with Hume's conception of causality in the Attempt to Introduce the Concept of Negative Magnitudes into Philosophy (1763) and Dreams of a Spirit-Seer Explained by Dreams of Metaphysics (1766). In the former Kant introduces a distinction between "logical grounds" and "real grounds," both of which indicate a relationship between a

"ground" (cause or reason) and a "consequent" (or effect following from this ground) in indicating that the effect is not contained in, hence does not follow analytically from, its cause. In the latter, Kant indicates that the relation of cause and effect can only be understood through experience. At this pre-critical point, Kant's view of the relation of cause and effect is close to Hume's in the Enquiry.

Kant's quasi-Humean pre-critical view of causality, a view in which causality is a function of experience only, is transformed in the critical period when Kant introduces synthetic a priori judgments. In the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason and in later writings, Kant contends that the general possibility of knowledge, including the future science of metaphysics, depends on the possibility of synthetic a priori judgments. These are non-analytic judgments joining together synthetic and predicate in a way independent of experience.

In the critical period, Kant discusses Hume's view of causality in a number of places, including the Critique of Pure Reason and the Prolegomena. In the former, he is concerned with (Hume's view of) causality in the Second Analogy, the Third Antinomy, and, late in the book, in the Doctrine of Method. In the Prolegomena he responds to Hume in some detail in usefully recasting his argument.

Despite the existence of an immense literature on Kant, Hume and their relation, there is uncertainty about the exact nature of Kant's response to Hume. Strawson's reading of the critical philosophy suggests two points: first, Kant can and ought be read without idealism, hence without the Copernican revolution, in effect as an early analytic philosopher, for instance as someone committed to a solution of the typical analytic problem of semantic reference and, second, transcendental argument, for which Strawson offers an influential specimen, is key to grasping Kant's response to Hume. This suggestion has led to an interesting debate around transcendental argument (see Strawson, Stroud, Brueckner, Stern and others). Yet it is unclear that this debate contributes anything to understanding Kant's response to Hume.

The paper begins with an examination of Strawson's reading of Kant. Strawson suggests we ought to read Kant without idealism as a kind of empirical realist, and that transcendental arguments are key. I object that Strawson's reconstruction of Kant as an empirical realist attributes to him the kind of position Kant rejects in criticizing Hume. Kant's response to Hume suggests in part that Hume's position and all forms of empiricism are unable to account for causality, hence for objective knowledge through a position combining transcendental idealism and empirical realism

The paper then reviews transcendental arguments in Strawson, Stroud, Brueckner and

Stern. I suggest that they do not throw light on Kant's analysis of Hume's problem. One point is that there is a basic difference between answering the skeptic in showing the reality of the external world and in further showing there is an objective causal connection between external objects.

I believe that to grasp Kant's answer to Hume we need to return to Kant's Copernican revolution, which is the central insight of the critical philosophy. The Copernican revolution is his positive approach to knowledge in place of the representational approach, which he initially espouses and later rejects.

The deeper difficulty is to understand the enigmatic central claim of the Copernican revolution that, since appearances must conform to the structure of the understanding, we can only know what we in some sense "construct". This is a form of what is later called identity theory (Identitätstheorie). This view is Kant's solution to the problem of knowledge if, as he thinks, representationalism, to which he was earlier committed, fails. Hegel and Cassirer suggest interesting ways of construing this claim.

Does Kant answer Hume? transcendental idealism crucially depends, as he concedes, on his conception of the subject. Kant's position features an uneasy relation between the general conditions of knowledge and finite human being, between transcendental philosophy and philosophical anthropology. It is reasonable to think Kant anticipates what Husserl later studies under the heading of psychologism. The central difficulty concerns the conception of the subject. Modern philosophy features a view of the subject or subjectivity as the road to objectivity or objective knowledge. It is unclear how to solve this problem, unclear if it is solved in the critical philosophy.

Hume's conception of the subject, which is based on empirical psychology, falls into what Kant disparagingly refers to as Locke's physiology. Kant's rival theory of the subject in principle isolates the transcendental conditions of knowledge from the finite being in order to avoid what Husserl later calls psychologism.

This answer fails in at least two ways. First, it fails to explain link between the transcendental conditions of knowledge and the capacities of finite human beings. Second, it fails to show that the subjective conditions of the human understanding are sufficient to demonstrate an objective causal connection. I conclude that Kant's answer falls short of answering Hume.

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Hume and Davidson: Passion, Evaluation, and Truth
Юм и Дэвидсон: страсть, оценка и истина

Отталкиваясь от Второй книги Трактата, в особенности от части 2.3.3. «О влияющих мотивах воли», автор защищает «волевой» (конейтивистский) подход к пониманию метаэтической позиции Юма, противопоставляя его когнитивистскому подходу. Джон Брик считает волевые состояния центральными для определения Юмом моральности, из чего вытекает отрицание Юмом возможности истинностной оценки моральных суждений. Для подкрепления своей позиции он привлекает так называемую унифицированную теорию значения и действия Дональда Дэвидсона, предлагая рассматривать Юма как морального философа сквозь линзу философии Дэвидсона, в теории действия, эмоций и оценки которого обнаруживается множество юмианских черт.

Hume and Davidson

A central line of argument in my *Mind and Morality: An Examination of Hume's Moral Psychology* (Oxford University Press, 1996) runs as follows. In Book 2 ('Of the Passions') Hume develops a taxonomy of the passions along the following (obviously schematic) lines. Conative states (desires, volitions) have central roles to play in the generation of actions (whether bodily or non-bodily). Desires, conjoined with suitable cognitive states (beliefs), give rise to volitions, thus actions. They also prompt affective responses upon their (the desires') satisfaction or non-satisfaction: affective responses of being pleased or being displeased. Four kinds of affective states (pride and shame, love and hatred, the chief ones examined) are of particular interest to Hume. Each presupposes conative states of a certain kind; each is, in effect, a response to the satisfaction or non-satisfaction of conative states. Certain conative states presuppose affective states; they are, in effect, natural sequels to affective states. Love gives rise to the desire Hume calls benevolence, hatred to the desire one might term maleficence. Book 2 of the *Treatise* provides an elaborate causal account of the interactions amongst the conative and affective elements marked out in this taxonomy. Of particular interest is *Treatise* 2.3.3 ('Of the influencing motives of the will'). Following immediately on the heels of two sections 'Ofliberty and necessity', it sketches Hume's account of the origins of intentional actions, an account largely of a piece with that provided in

Davidson's 'Actions, Reasons and Causes' some 224 years later.

In *Mind and Morality* I argued at some length for a non-cognitivist, specifically a conativist, reading of Hume's metaethical position. In claiming that Hume is a conativist I did not claim that he took all moral judgments to be desires or aversions. Nor did I deny that he took many moral judgments to be affective responses. Neither more specific reading struck me as remotely plausible. Rather, I claimed that the taxonomy of the passions presented in my first paragraph above provides the pattern of moral evaluations that Hume envisages- and that he argues for. One might say, to put the main point briefly, that conative states are central to Hume's characterization of morality and to his metaethical arguments, following the argument of 2.3.1, at 3.1.1-2. I took Hume's arguments for his conativist account to commit him to a non-cognitivist theory, the key ingredient in such a theory being the denial of truth evaluability to moral judgments and to the sentences in which they are expressed. In elaborating, and defending, that last claim I invoked Donald Davidson's account of so-called radical interpretation, more specifically his then little-noted account of a so-called unified theory of meaning and action. (In rendering Davidson as a non-cognitivist I misrendered him. More on this later.)

The theme of the present conference is Hume and Modern Philosophy. I interpret that to be Hume and (more) contemporary philosophy. My present way of engaging that theme is to view Hume- at least Hume the moral philosopher - through a Davidsonian lens. I find strikingly many Humean elements in Donald Davidson's theories of action, of emotion, and of evaluation- much that supports the sort of conativism I attribute to Hume. Consonant with those conativist elements, however, is a distinctive form of cognitivism that Hume could, perhaps should, have endorsed. I shall look first to the conativist dimensions in Davidson's work: conativist dimensions in his views on reasons for action, and so on the intersection of desires and beliefs in the causation of action; and conativist dimensions in his account of the emotions, specifically of pride (and by extension shame). Turning to his unified theory of meaning and action, I shall display the way in which Davidson's conativism leads to his distinctive cognitivist theory. Throughout I shall focus on matters that bear on the issue of passion (whether desire or emotion), evaluation, and truth. I shall consider the vantage points both of an envisaged interpreter and of an agent who is being interpreted. When representing Davidson's, not Hume's own, approach to the issues I shall perforce focus on matters of language, meaning, and truth. In doing so, however, I shall hope to shed light on Hrnne's own views. I shall leave to one side the question of what, specifically, constitutes an evaluation's

being a specifically moral one.

Desires, Emotions and Evaluation

I turn first to the case of reasons for action. Assrnning an asymmetry between beliefs and evaluations Davidson offers two ways in which to characterize the asymmetry, each involving relations with respect to the truth of sentences. Characterized one way, the asymmetry involves a single attitude (holding true) towards sentences of different types (descriptive and evaluative). Characterized in the other way, the asymmetry involves different attitudes - holding true and wanting true - towards sentences of the same (descriptive) type. Viewed the first way, a believer holds true the descriptive sentence 'Poverty is eradicated' while an evaluator holds true the evaluative sentence 'Poverty should be eradicated'. Viewed the second way, a believer holds true the descriptive sentence 'Poverty is eradicated' while the evaluator wants true the same descriptive sentence, namely 'Poverty is eradicated'. This contrast introduces two different ways of representing the evaluations themselves: a cognitive way (as beliefs with explicitly evaluative content) and a conative way (as wants or desires with descriptive content). Davidson takes the two ways of representing the evaluations as (to a first pass) equivalent. I shall call these evaluations (in whichever way represented) Type C (for 'conative') evaluations.

We can find a like asymmetry for the case of Type A (for 'affective') evaluations. Davidson writes of pride: 'The theory I have constructed identifies the state someone is in if he is proud that p with his having the attitude of approving of himself because of p, and this in turn (following Hume) I have not distinguished from judging or holding that one is praiseworthy because of p'. Pride here serves as representative for other propositional affective-rather than conative- states. Summing up we can say that we have two ways of assigning Type A evaluations, the cognitive and the affective ways. In like manner, we have cognitive and conative ways of assigning Type C evaluations. We must add that, for the Type A cases, pairs of affective attitudes - pride and shame, joy and grief - are called for and can be countenanced in a straightforward way. We might introduce the paired notions of being pleased or displeased, or of being satisfied or dissatisfied. Viewing what I have termed the emotions in this way lends color to the claim that they constitute psychological primitives in addition to belief, desire, and intention.

In the case of so-called primary reasons for actions, Davidson invites us to think of an argument an agent might provide in support of her action, an action explainable, if Davidson is right, by reference to a certain sort of Type C evaluation (in whichever way represented)

and an appropriately related non evaluative belief. That argument renders the action intelligible by revealing what, as the agent sees it, can be said in its behalf. The argument's premises provide literal expression for the states that cause - that serve as rational causes of- the action. That expressing the relevant belief is a descriptive sentence. That expressing the agent's Type C evaluation (whether represented in the cognitive or the conative way) must be explicitly evaluative. Davidson invites us to think in a comparable way of reasons for Type A evaluations (and so for the emotions). Thinking explicitly of one of Hume's examples - a man's pride in ownership of a beautiful house (or his shame in owning a near-derelict one) - Davidson presses comparable, but not identical, claims. To understand the man's pride is to appreciate its causal structure: the man must both approve of owning a beautiful house - that is the prior evaluation - and believe that he owns a beautiful house; and the approval and belief in question must be joint causes of the individual's being proud that he owns a beautiful house. 'The causal relation', in Davidson's words, 'echoes a logical relation....The causes of pride are a judgment that everyone who exemplifies a certain property is praiseworthy and a belief that one exemplifies that property oneself' ('Hume's Cognitive Theory of Pride', 284). The causes of pride are thus judgments that logically imply the judgment that is identical with pride. (A qualification must, of course, be entered: to approve of agents who have a certain property is not to approve of them full stop.)

For Davidson, as for Hume, desires and emotions differ: for Davidson, a desirer wants true a given descriptive sentence whereas the subject of an emotion is pleased or displeased with, satisfied or dissatisfied by, the truth of such a sentence. Evaluative sentences expressive of desires must also differ from those expressive of emotion. The structures of putative arguments from premises to conclusions -as also the structures of those conclusions - must differ as well. Davidson has much to say- Hume next to nothing to say- on these more determinate matters.

It is time to turn to two further, difficult (and, I suggest, closely linked) matters: that of the centrality of desire (and so of conative evaluations); and that of cognitivism versus non-cognitivism in the matter of evaluation.

Interpretation, Evaluation, and Truth

Davidson's work on theory of action (and the joint roles of desire and non-evaluative belief) and on radical interpretation (and the joint roles of non-evaluative belief and meaning) led, in 'Expressing Evaluations' and in subsequent essays, to a unified theory of meaning and action. Recalling the two distinct ways (noted earlier) of representing the asymmetry between belief

and Type C evaluations, he remarks that which of the two ways of representing the asymmetry we take as basic 'make[s] all the difference to our study of the relation between valuing and language' (EE9). He recommends taking the latter way-taking desires in the conative way - as the basic way: 'we should take as basic the contrast between the attitude of belief and the attitude of desire as directed to the same sentences'(EE9). Io his actual development of a unified theory of meaning and action, it should be added, he attends only to beliefs and desires, not to what I have termed emotions. (But then, as suggested above, Davidson takes the conative as prior to the affective.)

Davidson's radical interpreter, with a unified theory of meaning and action in view, must begin with patterns of preference with respect to the truth of sentences that, upon interpretation, prove to be descriptive sentences. Such an interpreter must also, in the first instance, solve for type C evaluations represented, not as explicitly evaluative attitudes, but as desires with descriptive contents. Interpretation of the speaker's explicitly evaluative sentences - and attribution, to the speaker, of attitudes with explicitly evaluative content - can only come later. From the vantage point of the radical interpreter identification of desires is, quite plainly, more basic than identification of explicitly evaluative attitudes (of Type C), despite the equivalences noted earlier, and despite inferred identities. It must be prior, as well, to the identification of affective attitudes (whether described in explicitly evaluative, or in non-evaluative, ways) and, again, inferred identities. Davidson, as Hume, is what I earlier termed a conativist about evaluation.

Not addressing in the same general way the relations between Type A evaluations and language, Davidson discusses neither asymmetries between beliefs and evaluations of type A, nor the place of the emotions in, the project of radical interpretation. He has, then, no occasion to pose the question whether one or the other of the two ways, cognitive and affective, of representing Type A evaluations is the more basic one. Given their dependence on Type C evaluations, however, there is every reason to take the affective way of representing Type A evaluations to be more basic than the cognitive way. From the vantage point of the radical interpreter, talk of emotions must be more basic than talk of explicitly evaluative attitudes, despite the equivalences - indeed the identities - Davidson has endorsed.

The basicness of the conative and affective ways of representing evaluations of Types C and A comports with classical non-cognitivist (including Humean) renderings of evaluations. The methodological strategy of attending to the project of radical interpretation is of a (modem) piece with a classical non-cognitivist - certainly with Hume's - focus on the conditions on

action explanation when explicating evaluation. But where Hume views talk of evaluative beliefs as illusory, Davidson's recent work reveals cognitivist representations of evaluations of Types C and A to be, if non-basic from the vantage-point of the radical interpreter, nonetheless both apt and ineliminable. Their aptness brings the truth-aptness of evaluations in its train.

Evaluations of Types C and A, whether attributed in the cognitive way, or in the conative and affective ways, find expression in explicitly evaluative sentences that serve as premises or conclusions (as the case may be) in arguments that set out the evaluator's reasons for acting, desiring, or feeling as she does. These explicitly evaluative sentences are, one and all, evaluable in terms of their truth and falsity. Their truth-evaluability is required, Davidson argues, given the possibility of their appearance in such arguments, arguments themselves assessable in terms of their validity or invalidity (validity being defmed in terms of preservation of truth.) It is required, too, by their possible appearance as constituents in truth functional sentences. For the Davidsonian interpreter, of course, it also flows from the necessarily inclusive character of a truth-theoretical semantics for a natural language such as English: the canonically derivable T-sentences for any evaluative sentences in question set the truth conditions for those sentences.

The semantic nature of evaluative judgments is clear: to judge something as desirable, obligatory, or something such, is to represent it as having the evaluative property in question and there is, Davidson holds, 'no coherent way' to avoid the conclusion that it must either have or not have that property. In making such classifications - in employing the evaluative concepts in question - one deploys the concept of truth. In employing evaluative concepts an evaluator must be cognizant of the possible of mistake, so cognizant of the difference between her holding something valuable and its being so. To grasp what determines the contents of evaluative judgments, and so the possibility of genuine disagreement, is to see that evaluative judgments (and the explicitly evaluative attitudes they express) are evaluable, objectively, as true or false. That objectivity resides not in the independent existence of values (an unintelligible supposition) but in the requirement of independent, because intersubjective, norms. As reflection on the project of radical interpretation reveals, objectivity has its basis in intersubjectivity. (The link between objectivity and intersubjectivity is itself, of course, a distinctly Humean theme.) '[E]valuations are correct or incorrect', Davidson writes, 'by interpersonal- that is, impersonal, or objective- standards' ('The Objectivity of Value', 68).

It's time to take stock, and to take a further step - if not a step that Davidson has himself

taken. Evaluations, whether of type C or Type A, are truth-evaluable when represented in the cognitive way. The classical cognitivist about evaluations is, thus far, correct. Despite their expressibility by truth-apt evaluative sentences, however, Type A evaluations, when represented in the affective way as emotions with descriptive contents, prompt no question of truth or falsity. Though her uttered sentence 'My conduct is shameful' is true or false, when an evaluator is represented as feeling shame the notions of the truth and falsity of that feeling secure no purchase. The same is true when an evaluator is represented in the conative way as having a want or desire. Truth is in the offing, of course. It attaches to the explicitly evaluative sentences in which desires and emotions find literal expression, thus to implicated deployments, by their subjects, of evaluative concepts. It applies to the explicitly evaluative attitudes with which the desires and emotions are identical. But it fits ill when what I have termed the basic way of representing evaluations is itself in question.

Mode of attribution makes a material difference in the matter of truth. That said, it must also be said that neither mode of attribution, whether the evaluations be of type C or Type A, can be dispensed with. The conative and affective modes are, for the radical interpreter, the basic ones. The radical interpreter's move from basic to non-basic ways of representing evaluations is ineluctable, however, given the necessary expressibility, in truth-evaluable evaluative sentences, of states characterized as desires and emotions. While eschewing, at the start, the interpretation of sentences that prove (upon interpretation) to be evaluative ones, the interpreter must eventually turn to the evaluative sentences needed if the subject is to give expression to her reasons for acting and feeling as she does. To do that is to pair desires and emotions with the holding true of the evaluative sentences that express them. And to do that is to introduce the cognitive way of representing evaluations that are already in place. If non-basic from the vantage point of the interpreter this novel mode of representation is, nonetheless central. It is central, that is, from the vantage-point of the interpreter's representation of reason and argument.

On the assumption - Davidson's (not Hume's) - that the methodology of interpretation provides the route to our understanding of our most basic concepts, there is no settling for one or the other of the two classically exclusive choices - cognitivist or non-cognitivist - in the matter of evaluations. The Humean is right to think evaluation is basically a matter of desire and emotion. His cognitivist opponent is right to think evaluation is centrally a matter of truth and falsity. On the present showing, evaluation is, ineluctably, a matter of desire and emotion - and of truth.

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"Morality is a subject that interests us above all others..."
«Нравственность – такой предмет, который интересует нас больше всех остальных…»

В самом начале Книги третьей «О морали» «Трактата о человеческом познании» Юм выдвигает тезис, ставший названием этой статьи, о том, что «нравственность – такой предмет, который интересует нас больше остальных». Почему для Юма мораль представляет такой большой интерес? Чтобы понять это, необходимо увидеть проект Юма в целом и рассмотреть его в контексте, в особенности, я хотел бы уделить внимание историческому контексту, в котором формировались идеи Юма. В моем прочтении, Юм не был главным образом эпистемологом, а был прежде всего политическим теоретиком, и обсуждение причинности и индукции являются побочными продуктами его центрального проекта в Трактате. Интерес Юма к нравственности объясняется тем, что он рассматривал ее как ключ к достижению мира в обществе. Сосредоточившись на том, в чем состоял интерес Юма и почему, мы можем многое узнать о его роли в интеллектуальной истории.

At the very beginning of Book 3 – of Morals – Hume claims that "Morality is a subject that interests us above all others...". Why is Hume is concerned most with morality? To answer that question I will pay some attention to the historical context in which Hume's ideas were formed, i.e., to his problematic.

I start with two claims. First, Hume was not principally an epistemologist.

Second, why is morality so important? The answer to this second question is to be found in the rest of the sentence that forms our title.

We fancy the peace of society to be at stake in every decision concerning it; and 'tis evident that this concern must make our speculations appear more real and solid, than where the subject is in a great measure, indifferent to us. (T, page 455)

Hume's strategy in the Treatise was first to attack reason because he was interested primarily in why people do what they do, not in why they think what they think. And he was convinced that people do what they do not because they were motivated by rational arguments. People do what they do because of their feelings – i.e., their beliefs and their passions.

Figuring out what motivates people to act is the goal of Hume's Science of Man, the proclaimed object of the Treatise. He notes,

> Tis evident, that all the sciences have a relation, greater of less, to human nature; and that however wide of them may seem to run of it, they still return back by one passage or another. Even Mathematics, Natural Philosophy, and Natural Religion, are in some measure dependant on the science of MAN. (p. xix)

He continues,

> If the sciences of Mathematics, Natural Philosophy, and Natural Relgion, have such a dependence on the knowledge of man, what may be expected in the other sciences, whose connexion with human nature is more close and intimate? (ibid)

These other sciences are logic, morality, criticism, and politics.

His proposal on how to correct the situation and put the sciences on as best a footing as possible is

> …to leave the tedious lingering method, which we have hitherto followed, and instead of taking now and then a castle or village on the frontier, to march up directly to the capital or center of these sciences, to human nature itself; which being once masters of, we nay every where else hope for an easy victory. (xx)

But there is a caveat:

> …'tis still certain we cannot go beyond experience; and any hypothesis, that pretends to discover the ultimate original qualities of human nature, ought at first to be rejected as presumptuous and chimerical. (xx)

So, while Hume sets knowledge of human nature in his sights, he cautions that complete victory is impossible. Further, he cautions against employing too sophisticated a method, not going beyond observation. And he concludes this line of thinking with a somewhat restrained sense of reality.

> When we see, that we have arrived at the utmost extent of human reason, we sit down contented; tho we be perfectly satisfied in the main of our ignorance, and perceive that we can give no reason for our most general and refined principles, beside our experience of their reality; which is the reason of the mere vulgar, and which required no study at first to have discovered for the most particular and most extraordinary phenomenon. (xxii)

And so it seems that Hume has few expectations for his march up to the capital than to reveal our ignorance and our total reliance on experience. Thus the plan of the Treatise is as follows: Book 1 – attack the primacy of reason, show that reason tells us nothing about the world nor does it

motivate action. So what does motivate action? The passions – Book 2. Here Hume develops a positive account of the causal mechanisms behind human action. Why? So that in Book 3 he can formulate an answer to the original question of why people do what they do.

Now one can argue whether Hume was successful in his attack on reason and about whether or not the epistemology of Book 1 is really epistemology or proto-psychology. These are unimportant concerns. At the time he was writing these were issues in the air – how does the mind work? – why do we do what we do? People were wrestling with them – sometimes in less coherent fashion than others – but clarity emerges over time, not at the time.

It is commonplace when teaching philosophy to describe western philosophy as a 2500 year old conversation among (mostly) men concerned with some of the basic questions inherent in the human condition, a view fraught with difficulties. Among other things, it leads to the current situation in North American philosophy where the philosophical community is so deeply engaged in talking to one another or to Aristotle or Hume, that philosophy is increasing seen as irrelevant,

Seeing philosophy as this 2500 year conversation also allows the ancient Greeks to set the contemporary agenda. It is not clear to me why the questions that concerned the Greeks should be the questions that concern us. So, to call philosophy a 2500 year old conversation is to greatly over-simply that discussion.

To ignore the impact of the social, political and cultural environment in which philosophers work out their questions and answers is not only to see philosophy as out of touch and otherworldly, but to endorse that view. I, however, happen to think that philosophy is very much in this world and important to the cultural health of our peoples. This is not to say that studying the writings of David Hume is without merit. It is, however, to give further merit to a different question "Why are you interested in Hume?" My answer is "to understand his response to the social, political, economic and moral uncertainties of the early 18th century," i.e., his problematic. A problematic is a set of concerns that attract a group of people, sometimes serially, that have an historical basis and which take time to be worked out, if ever.

Hume explains that his interest in morality stems from the fact that

> We fancy the peace of society to be at stake in every decision concerning it; and 'tis evident that this concern must make our speculations appear more real and solid, than where the subject is in a great measure, indifferent to us.

So what might be the subject to which he is indifferent? The short answer is the conceits of reason. At the end of Book one he observes regarding his negative earlier efforts:

> Most fortunately it happens, that since reason is incapable of dispelling these clouds, nature herself suffices to that purpose, and cures me of this philosophical melancholy and delirium, either by relaxing this bent of mind or by some avocation, and lively impression of my senses which obliterate all these chimeras. I dine, I play a game of back-gammon, I converse, and am merry with my friends; and when after three or four hours' amusement, I would return to these speculations, they appear so cold, so strain'd, and ridiculous, that I cannot find in my heart to enter into them further. (p 269)

He goes on to observe that "Here, then I find myself absolutely and necessarily determin'd to live, and talk , and act like other people in the common affairs of life." But while he finds idle speculation for which no conclusive positive results follow increasingly repulsive, he does admit that

> I cannot forbare having a certain curiosity to be acquainted with the principles of moral good and evil. The nature and foundation of government, and the cause of these several passions and inclinations, which actuate and govern me (270-1)

And why are these the topics that interest him? I suggest first because "we fancy the peace of society to be at state in every decision concerning it." The "it" being morality taken in its broad, social-science sense. And second, because he wants to know why he does what he does.

It is not really surprising that a young man of exceptional intelligence and sensitivity would have these issues first and foremost before him. Now as we reflect on what amounts to 100 years of civil strife and social unrest both preceding and engulfing Hume, it is understandable that a young Scotsman of certain worldly ambitions would yearn for some stability in which he might create a life of letters. This is not to say that Hume consciously reflected on this period with those considerations in mind. Rather it is simply to acknowledge the circumstances in which he was trying to establish himself. Or, to put it more boldly, the ways of the world had something to do with choice of topics and issues. And it might be these factors that attracted him to Hutchinson and others who saw morality as stemming from non-rational sources.

The point here is that events in the world have an impact on what people do and why they do it. Sometimes, and this is the nature of problematics, there are unexpected results. In the case of David Hume, we need look no further than his influence on Adam Smith.

Hume published his Essays shortly after the Treatise, in 1741. It would be difficult to make the case for the Essays simply being a popular version of the Treatise since the range of topics is

much greater and there is little by way of appeal to basic principles. One of the more remarkable topics Hume addresses in the Essays is economics. The views Hume expresses here are pregnant with concerns that his friend and informal student, Adam Smith, will go on to develop in his seminal Wealth of Nations. In terms of final impact, Hume's economic essays may be the most important things he wrote, not necessarily because of their direct significance, but because of their influence on Smith.

In sum, by concentrating on what Hume was personally interested it and why, we can learn a lot about his ultimate role in our intellectual history. The bottom line is this: the real importance of an historical figure is to be found in the problematics they are engaged in. Those problematics are historical entities, influenced by both individuals and the events of the time. To ignore them is to ignore why for Hume "morality is a subject that interests" him above all others and hence confounds our ability to understand the Treatise as a whole.

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A Philosopher of Diminished expectations – is this the Secret to D. Hume's Popularity?
Философ заниженных ожиданий – в этом ли секрет популярности Дэвида Юма?

С. Фуллер, который по собственному признанию отнюдь не восхищен философией Юма, считая ее медлительной и полной перестраховок, анализирует причину философской популярности его работ. Давая беглый обзор рецепции Юма в британской культуре, он отмечает, что Юм медленно набирал репутацию философа первой величины и достиг ее прежде всего благодаря Иммануилу Канту и ставшему академическим после него разделению на рационализм и эмпиризм. Анализируя данную дихотомию (рационализм/эмпиризм), Фуллер предлагает набросок оригинальной концепции «когнитивной экономики», в которой рационалисты предстают сторонниками эпистемологии спроса, а эмпирики - эпистемологии предложения.

1. Introduction: The History of Epistemology as Competing Schools of Cognitive Economics

The dynamic of the history of epistemology is best understood if you imagine epistemology to be a branch of economics -- 'cognitive economics', if you will. In that case, one can distinguish *demand*- and *supply*-side epistemologists. The former believe in proportion to the need served by the belief, the latter in proportion to the available evidence for the belief. At the end of epistemology's cornerstone work, *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781), Immanuel Kant famously canonised these two positions as, respectively, *rationalism* and *empiricism*, which came to be enshrined in the curriculum as the foundations of what is still called 'modern philosophy'. Kant suggested that this distinction had been played out across the entire history of philosophy, moving roughly from one of general metaphysics to a more narrowly epistemological horizon, as the distinctness of 'the human' itself came more clearly into view. A sense of the drift in the distinction up to the time of Kant is captured as follows:

	Rationalist	**Empiricist**
Form-Matter Relation	Divided (Plato)	Merged (Aristotle)
Nature of Life	Outworking of Spirit (Stoic)	Combination of Matter (Epicurus)

Definition of Human	Apprentice Deity (Franciscan)	Enhanced Animal (Dominican)
Function of Mind	Expression of Reason (Descartes, Leibniz)	Reception of Experience (Locke, Hume)

In the late 19th century, the 'economic' character of this distinction explicitly came to the fore, with Ernst Mach and Charles Sanders Peirce arriving at some of the most memorable formulations. (Nicholas Rescher carries on this tradition today.) However, the clearest trace of this transition to 'cognitive economics' transpired between W.K. Clifford's 'The Ethics of Belief' (1877) and William James' response, 'The Will to Believe' (1896). Cast against type, Clifford the mathematician defended a supply-side empiricist epistemology, whereas James the physician backed a demand-side rationalist epistemology. However, by that time 'empiricism' was replaced by 'evidentialism' and 'rationalism' by 'decisionism'.

A flavour of what epistemology looks like once economised is captured here:

	Demand-Side Epistemology	**Supply-Side Epistemology**
Metaphysics	Transcendentalism	Naturalism
Theory	Profit Anticipated	Capital Possessed
Evidence	Profit Made	Capital Invested
Attitude to Risk	Hope of Gain	Fear of Loss
Truth Goal	The Whole Truth (plus false?)	Only the Truth (even if small?)
Likely Error	Overestimation	Underestimation
Experience	Barrier (test) to be met and overcome	Ground on which knowledge is built
Psychopathology	Adaptive Preference Formation	Confirmation Bias
Motto	'What doesn't kill me makes me stronger'.	'If it ain't broke, don't fix it'.

Hume's centrality to this story was brought out most clearly by the modern champion of demand-side economics, John Maynard Keynes. It was his *Treatise on Probability* (1921) that canonised 'Hume's problem of induction' in the way it is taught in philosophy today, namely, as a question about the grounds for generalising from past to future experience. Keynes' point was

that human life was all about dealing with this uncertainty by developing a theory of rational risk-taking. Indeed, life is the game of beating the odds against death. In that case, Hume's option of scepticism in the face of inconclusive evidence is at best a formula for bare survival – not a flourishing existence. That Hume should have thought otherwise reveals his relatively low expectations for the human condition – that is, we should preserve what we know from experience to work rather than try to leverage it into some unknown future state.

2. Hume as the Icon of Counter-Progressive Naturalism

I have always found David Hume's enduring philosophical popularity puzzling. A noteworthy figure in his own day, Hume makes several appearances in Boswell's *Life of Johnson* as one of the leading 18th century Edinburgh wits. However, his reputation was mainly as one of the original Scottish Tories, someone who gave historical legitimation to the United Kingdom, which had come into existence only a few years before his birth. His view of history somewhat anticipated today's evolutionary psychologists, who underwrite the force of precedent and tradition with remarks about their adaptive character vis-à-vis the race and environment of the people concerned. Indeed, Hume believed that humanity had multiple origins – indeed, that different races may constitute different species. Thus, his arguments against Black enslavement anticipate today's opponents of cruelty to animals who would stop short of granting animals legally binding rights. Blacks are adapted to one sort of environment and Whites to another – and each race does best where they belong.

Hume only started to acquire a specifically philosophical reputation with T.H. Huxley's 1879 popular presentation of him as a precursor to Darwin's naturalistic world-view, including its agnosticism with regard to ultimate causes. Nowadays, Hume is regarded still more positively, even to philosophy's own disadvantage. He appears as a great therapeutic thinker in the lineage of Epicurus, Montaigne and Wittgenstein, who aims to deflate metaphysical pretensions by revealing their futility, as evidenced by the mental anguish that their pursuit causes. In effect, we are now asked to respond to Hume in the exact opposite way to how Kant did: Instead of looking to Hume for a challenge to our sense of species privilege (which is worth defending), we should be looking to Hume as a means to escape that privilege altogether – or at least, so would today's received wisdom have us believe.

Prior to Huxley's book, the spectre of Hume was raised in philosophical circles to illustrate the sceptical dead-end to which empiricism led, a view that was still popular when I first studied philosophy in the 1970s, and which I still believe is largely correct. This view was first popularised in Oxford in the third quarter of the 19th century by Thomas Hill Green, the doyen of

British idealists. Green was less interested in Hume *per se* than in the claims of the nascent science of psychology, which claimed Lockean empiricism as its foundation. Hill treated Hume as the *reductio* of this line of thought: If you take the sensing individual as the locus for knowledge, then you will be forced to conclude that knowledge is impossible because your mind does not stand apart as a separate entity, empowered to judge the combination of sensations that it receives. At most, there will be shifts between phenomenal states relative to a given body that may or may not overlap with those of other similarly embodied beings. Instead of Locke's free agents, the Humean 'individual' (if that is still the right word) is dissolved into a site for shifting passions.

Nowadays we regard Hume's view of the self as a 'bundle of sensations' as prescient of a variety of anti-essentialist views on personal identity that became popular in the final quarter of the 20th century, including Derek Parfit's time-slice utilitarianism and Daniel Dennett's self-justifying narrativism. However, to understand Green's original animus to Hume, one might consider the outrage initially expressed when Richard Dawkins claimed that organisms were simply more or less adequate vehicles for the propagation of genes. In Hume's case, the idea is that our 'selves' are no more than convenient animal-shaped parcels for registering and expressing sensations for a certain period of time (i.e. the span of our life) and then dispersed (given no underlying soul or afterlife). Whenever he had the opportunity, Hume stymied any pretence that a faculty called 'reason' might have in either inferring deep causes or predicting the relatively distant future. In both cases, he claimed, we fall back on that enhanced collection of habits he called 'animal instinct'.

In Green's day, Hume's position was widely seen as based on a conflation of the 'is' of predication and the 'is' of identity. In other words, while the self does indeed possess sensations, it is not exhaustively constituted by them. This point had been driven home most forcefully by James Ferrier, the Scottish idealist who introduced 'epistemology' into English in the mid-19th century. Ferrier, under the influence of Fichte and Hegel, saw the self as a god-like, second-order entity that captured the blindspots missed by first-order perception. Properly deployed, the self was capable of providing normative focus to experiences that might otherwise be treated with equal significance simply by virtue of appearing before the mind's eye.

It is worth recalling that 'consciousness', the term normally used to capture this second-order 'standing above' relationship to experience, was only coined in the generation before Hume's birth by Ralph Cudworth, a friend of Locke and one of the Cambridge Christian Platonists. The idea of consciousness was designed to provide a sense of ownership to one's mind by obliging it

to organize otherwise contradictory experience into a coherent whole, the internal logic of which would then mark one's own identity. One implication, which became increasingly important for the history of epistemology, was the purposefulness with which one comes to know 'objects' (i.e. the 'objective' of thought, aka 'intentionality'). In other words, it is not simply a matter of the mind allowing itself to be receptive to the world – either intellectually or experientially – but that a quasi-ethical demand was placed on the thinker to take the initiative to organize his mental life.

Here Green was using philosophy to score political points. In his day, psychology was being promoted as a scientific metaphysics with quite discernible political consequences, namely, support for a form of *laissez faire* individualism that embedded humanity firmly in the animal kingdom – *à la* Herbert Spencer. Green presented Hume as the ironic culmination of this tradition: individualism self-deconstructed. Although Green's influence turned out to be quite limited in philosophy, his viewpoint strongly coloured the constitution of the British civil service ethic and later facilitated the Labour Party's split from the Liberals. Green saw Hume as having reduced the 'person' to the individual body, only then in turn to reduce that body to a site for registering clearly body-related experience. While such a view might work in a world in which individuals are understood as members of a population whose identities are determined purely in terms of overlapping properties (e.g. shared genes, shared experience), it does not work in a world where individual are valued in their own right, in which case the relevant relationships with other individuals is not in terms of occurrent natural properties but formally undertaken arrangements. This then became the principal metaphysical basis on which sociology split from biology across Europe a century ago.

3. The Existential Consequences of Hume's Diminished Cognitive Expectations

Despite failing to provide an adequate metaphysical basis for the autonomous individual required of social liberalism, Hume has remained the darling of philosophers because of his consistent scepticism in the face of all forms of authority, be it religious or scientific – even if at the end he leaves us with relatively little 'common knowledge' on which found an epistemology. The key to his appeal may rest on his capacity to provide sharp 'observational' judgements in the most literal sense. In other words, Hume appears to use his memory to translate what he sees – which would otherwise be a set of fleeting impressions -- into a clear and distinct object of thought. (It may also explain Hume's fondness for journalism as a 'philosophical' activity.) This is not a trivial point. After all, on the one hand, one's memory might be regarded as generally unreliable, if not simply degenerative over time; on the other, one's vision might be held to be inherently

partial, and hence routinely failing to encompass the entire relevant spatio-temporal context for understanding what one sees. Had Hume taken these liabilities seriously, he would have been driven to invoke either authoritative testimony or some higher 'rational' faculty – one not driven by sensation – to modify, critique or overrule whatever passes before one's eyes. On the contrary, it turns out that Hume was sufficiently convinced by memory-focussed observation that he used it to resolve the profoundest metaphysical disputes.

A good case in point is his dismissal of the argument from design in nature in *Dialogues concerning Natural Religion* (1779), which combines four observations: (1) in order for the idea of an 'intelligent designer' of nature to be intelligible, said 'designer' must engage in an indefinitely extended version of what humans do when they intelligently design; (2) in that case, we should recognise the handiwork of such a designer in nature, yet we are presented with imperfection and change over time; (3) moreover, whatever evidence for design we detect in nature appears to have come about in a manner quite different from that of human design, so as to cast doubt on whether what happens in nature is by design at all; (4) in light of the foregoing, we might reasonably conclude that the very idea of an intelligent designer is nothing more than an anthropocentric – if not outright egocentric – delusion.

Modern atheism – especially the current strain of 'New Atheism' of Richard Dawkins and other Anglo-American public intellectuals – is founded on these 'arguments', a term I place in scare quotes because Hume is really expressing a normative attitude about how we should use our brains, or interpret the products of our brains. Thus, when Hume advocates a moral science based on 'experimental reasoning', he is not referring to either the spirit or the practice of the 'experimental method' as it is understood today (or arguably even by Francis Bacon). Rather, he simply means the process by which we discount the evidentiary weight of authorities and then test against new experience what our 'free' (from authority) memory-enhanced observation would have us expect. Hume does not imagine that someone like Newton – let alone a latter day scientist – might successfully simulate, in either the 'controlled' (aka intelligently designed) environment of the laboratory or the code of a computer programme, conditions that would have given rise to nature as we experience it now.

In other words, Hume could not imagine adopting the creator's standpoint in an attempt to reverse-engineer divine creation – perhaps because he felt he would have to believe in God first. But of course, such a task makes eminent sense, if we take literally that we have been created 'in the image and likeness of God'. Like most latter-day atheists, Hume does not even entertain this possibility, which leads him to fall back on the fact that to our memory-enhanced observation,

organisms appear to come about, develop and die quite differently from machines. He never considers that this difference in appearance might be superficial – in particular, that organisms are more machine-like than our 'natural' senses would have us believe. To be sure, in the second half of the 18th century, this would have been a heroic hypothesis. Nevertheless, it was increasingly pursued in the 19th and certainly the 20th centuries, and it bore remarkable fruit – not least the molecular revolution in biology. Indeed, in retrospect, we might say that the long-standing metaphysical dispute between 'mechanism' and 'organism' has been simply one of perspective, in which the mechanists look at nature from the side of the creator and organicists from the side of the created. Here it is worth recalling that while Hume is popularly regarded as a pro-science philosopher, his esteem for Newton is limited to his having identified durable, general empirical regularities in nature – not that he has fathomed nature's *modus operandi*, let alone the levers of divine agency.

Here Hume is usefully contrasted with two of the leading dissenting Christian ministers and scientists of his day, David Hartley and Joseph Priestley. In particular, Priestley, who (despite theoretical errors) is normally credited with the discovery of oxygen, took the aim of experiment to be to reproduce, not conditions that somehow emerge spontaneously in nature, but the physical parameters within which the divine plan is implemented. Unlike modern accounts of the experimental method, which tend to discount the experimenter's personality (if not treat it as an outright liability), Priestley regarded the experimenter's participation in a laboratory demonstration as crucial to capture not only how nature behaves but also how God meant it to behave. Since Priestley included the creative side of the experimental process as part of its official record of scientific evidence, his method is nowadays often characterised as 'sloppy' or (when polite) 'phenomenological'. But again, this is merely because we do not take experiments to reveal anything about some hypothetical 'natural experimenter' (aka God) – only about some hypothetical 'nature'.

Finally, let me say something a bit more about the rival conceptions of the brain that distinguished Hume from Hartley and Priestley, since all three philosophers are normally lumped together in history of psychology textbooks as members of the 'associationist' school of thought. For Hume, the brain's associative powers are simply an expression of our animal natures. To be sure, our mind is regularly exposed to competing and contradictory experiences but over time these 'animal spirits' eventually settle into habits, reflections upon which become the bases for the laws of nature that we discover. In contrast, Hartley and Priestley were both somewhat aligned with the 'enthusiast' wing of the Christian Enlightenment (which included Methodism),

which even Hume had realized in his essay 'On Superstition and Enthusiasm' managed to marry a fiercely pro-God and pro-science attitude. The enthusiasts interpreted our animal spirits as forcing upon us decisions to resolve these conflicting associations with which experience normally presents us. This was the context in which Priestley first introduced the utilitarian principle of weighing costs and benefits to determine maximum benefit and minimum pain. Such calculation was seen as a physically necessary yet normatively defining process, as it focussed the brain in a way that both integrated and displaced the original conflicting experiences in a more edifying direction. Indeed, this process may have provided the psychological prototype for the idea of dialectical synthesis found in the German idealist tradition. Certainly this was the impression left by Friedrich Engels in his singular praise of Priestley in his late work, *Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy* – and it anticipates Keynes' rationalisation of the animal spirits, in respect to which the Humean conception of the human condition appears safe, slow and satisfied. Perhaps this is what philosophers want out of life? Let's hope not.

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Hume, Kant and today's Aristotelian Counter Enlightenment

Юм, Кант и современное аристотелианское анти-Просвещение

Современные последователи Аристотеля убеждены, что развитие науки и

сопровождавшая его философия Просвещения представили искаженный взгляд на человека. Пожалуй, наиболее значительной философской ошибкой, связанной с высокой оценкой науки, является утверждение о существовании непреодолимой пропасти между фактами и ценностями, проводимое, в частности, философами-просветителями Д. Юмом и И. Кантом. Однако, критика Макдауэллом «натурализма» Юма и «супра-натурализма» Канта не является убедительной. Его реконструкция нововременной философии оказывается мифом, который не отдает должного ни философии Юма, ни философии Канта, ни «нововременной философии в целом». Поскольку его критика не является убедительной, нас также не убеждает и его этический натурализм, который зависит от правдоподобности этой критики.

1. Introduction

Modern Aristotelians are convinced that the sciences and the philosophy of enlightenment following them paint a misleading picture of man. The possibly most important philosophical error associated with the appreciation of science is, according to them, the view that there is an unbridgeable gap between facts and values, held by the enlightenment philosophers David Hume and Immanuel Kant, among others. In my paper, I discuss arguments brought forward by John McDowell and others against Hume and Kant and argue that they are misleading.

Although McDowell's critique of the critique of pre-modern Greek naturalism, i.e. his anti-anti-realism, does not bear his entire argument for his version of an ethical naturalism, but it bears a crucial part of it. McDowell's markedly indirect explanation of ethical naturalism is due to his belief that the practice of justifying practical judgments is constitutive for modern philosophy. However, this practice becomes obsolete once we do not take the concerns about the relation between reason and world any longer seriously, that have originated from the artificial separation of facts and values. We then can follow our common sense which reconciles us with nature, as there is no distance between common sense and nature. With common sense, we place ourselves in a philosophical tradition that has been obstructed by modern philosophy. However, should our deliberations show that McDowell's critique does not pertain to modern philosophy, there would be no prima facie reason to follow him towards the territory of Greek naturalism. And my argument will be precisely this. McDowell's critique of Humean 'naturalism' and of Kantian 'supra-naturalism' is not convincing. On second thought, his reconstruction of modern philosophy proves to be a myth that does justice neither to Hume, nor to Kant, nor to "the modern philosophy" in general.

2) Hume

McDowell's claim that Hume's subjectivism does not have any contact with 'first' nature is therefore misleading. McDowell can justifiably criticize Hume (if that can be a criticism at all) for claiming that the feelings that bring about our values do not represent anything; but he cannot reproach him for having considered the world of meanings in total detachment from first nature. Just as the white billard ball collides with the black one and puts it into motion, the feeling of gratitude is caused by our perception of a certain situation inside us.

It is important to take into account here that our gratitude expresses more than the factual effect of a natural event on our mind. Gratitude is a normative notion. Hume's crucial insight is: Our reactions can hit or miss 'first' nature. In order to 'hit' 'first' nature, we have to dispose of correspondent sensibility which he calls "moral taste". McDowell thus neglects that there is not only the Hume of hydraulics but also the Hume of a cultivation of our affective nature. Those who do not develop a "moral taste", according to Hume, will not react with gratitude when in a situation that deserves gratitude. Just as our 'second' nature lets us enter the 'space of reasons', according to McDowell, our taste enables us, according to Hume, to react 'correctly' to things and situations. Our taste constitutes something like a 'normative normality' of our practice of judgment to which we implicitly refer when approving or disapproving of persons and actions. In fact, McDowell could have liked this aspect of Hume's theory of practical meanings because of its proximity to the idea of "second nature" – had he taken notice of it.

3. Kant

It will be shown that McDowell's criticism of Kant's fails (besides others) because of these reasons: McDowell does not take into consideration that Kant's terms "justification" and "foundation" have two different meanings with regard to practical reason: The first meaning emerges from Kant's thesis that the nature of science does not include an unconditional Ought. Because the unconditional validity of the moral law cannot be derived from our experience, this Ought requires a foundation. This foundation consists in solving the question how our consciousness of moral Ought Kant describes in the Critique of practical reason as a "fact of pure reason" (AA 5, 47 (CE, vol. Practical Philosophy, 177)) is possible in turn. This consciousness is possible because we are free – and our freedom is possible in turn because we are located, as freely acting beings, outside of the nomological order of nature. So, Kant goes back to transcendental idealism not with the intention to conduct a transcendental 'injection of meaning'; he goes back to this doctrine rather in order to explain the possibility of what we really experience. Put in a non-Kantian manner: Consciousness of moral Ought is a matter of

fact of our human existence, and not something that has to be injected 'from the outside'.

The second meaning of foundation is located within the Kantian conception of practical reason. According to McDowell, Kant does only intend to justify certain moral obligations by using the categorical imperative, but he also wants to demonstrate why we ought to act morally. But Kant fails in his attempt to demonstrate the practical reality of pure reason. The 'powerlessness of practical reason' therefore reveals, as McDowell argues, the misery of a kind of philosophy that seeks to establish virtue and morality from a perspective external to nature. Does Kant assume, as McDowell argues, that pure practical reason issues commands independent from our "motivational constitution"? I do not know any passages in his writings where Kant would make that kind of claim. Quite the opposite. Kant does not want to show that we ought to serve in the 'army of duty' although we are originally in no way motivated to do so. On the contrary, Kant wants to call attention to the fact that we are for the start and always members of this army. To stick to McDowell's – martial – image: Kant's army is not an 'army of volunteers' but a 'people's army'. We simply do not have the choice, according to Kant, to not be motivated by pure practical reason. It is, in the guise of a feeling of respect, always a part of our "subjective motivational constitution" – to take up Bernard Williams' famous expression. Accordingly, Kant writes in the Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals that moral Ought is "his [scil. man's] own necessary 'will' as a member of an intelligible world", and that it is "thought by him [man] as 'ought' only insofar as he regards himself at the same time as a member of the world of sense" (AA IV 455 (CE . vol. Practical Philosophy, 101)). If we would not always be moral creatures, we could not be convinced by any argument in the world to seriously consider moral reasons. So, Kant would downrightly agree to Foot, who believes that we cannot asked for reasons where reasons come a priori to an end.

When we try to understand why McDowell is unable to notice the agreement between his ethical naturalism and Kant regarding this point, we come across the formal nature of pure practical reason. By concentrating on formal nature, McDowell overlooks that Kant is not only the theorist of pure practical reason and the categorical imperative; especially in the Critique of practical reason and in his lectures on anthropology Kant points to the fact that we cannot expect that human beings also have a subjective motivation to act with respect for the moral law in case they have not attained a corresponding character. Someone who does not have a corresponding disposition might be able to recognize moral reasons, but he does not consider them subjectively relevant for his actions. Kant's position is conveyed by the following quotation from his 1781/82 anthropology lectures: "All morality requires knowledge of man so that we do not palaver vapid

admonitions to them but understand to direct them in such a way that they begin to appreciate moral laws, and make them their principles. I have to know in which ways I can access human attitudes in order to yield resolutions; this can be brought about by the knowledge of man, so the educator, the preacher, is able to yield real resolutions, and not just sobbing and tears" (AA XXV 858). Thus, without anthropology, culture, emotion, and character pure practical reason does not quite come to life according to Kant as well. These abilities and capacities sensitizing us practically for moral obligations designate precisely what McDowell describes as "second nature" in Mind and World: „Our nature is largely second nature, and our second nature is the way it is not just because of the potentialities we were born with, but also because of our upbringing, our Bildung." (McDowell 1994, 87.4)

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Normativity as Reflexivity

Нормативность как рефлексивность

Hume's philosophical system owes its persisting interest to its comprehensive articulation of the scientific worldview. All the phenomena of human cognition and volition are explained by appeal to the same causal principles that govern nonhuman nature. Our cognition begins with the apprehension of discrete sensible particulars, which Hume calls impressions. These impressions exhibit regularities, and the awareness of these regularities generates belief that the regularities extend to unobserved particulars, and to "paint" the regularities onto things outside our minds. But the process of belief-generation is itself an instance of a causal regularity in our experience. Through systematic study, exemplified in Hume's *Treatise of Human Nature*, of

human thought and action, we arrive at the belief that these phenomena are determined through causal processes– and of course this belief is itself also determined through a causal process. Though the result of this is a philosophy in which there is no place for such cherished ideas as free will or moral reason as a determiner of ends, Hume thinks not only that his arguments support his claims, but also that we already recognize the truth of his view, for example in our expectation of the effects of punishment on the actions of others.

At least since Kant, however, the chief objection to Hume's system concerns its *normativity*. For Hume clearly does not aim only to explain our beliefs, in the sense of showing how they arise. He clearly also wants to urge us to give up some beliefs, such as the belief in miracles, and endorse others, and this seems to require that Hume offer not only causal explanations of belief but also criteria for assessing their justification. As Kant puts it, Hume can answer the *quaestio facti* of the origin of belief, but not the *quaestio juris* of its truth. If Hume truly offers us nothing but causal explanations rather than justifications, then it appears, paradoxically, that he is the most obvious perpetrator of the naturalistic fallacy, deriving an 'is' from an 'ought'– the very fallacy he describes in Book Two of the *Treatise*!

It is no surprise, therefore, that Hume occupies a central place in the lively recent discussion on the "sources of normativity," to borrow Christine Korsgaard's phrase. I want to focus here on a particular strategy for defending Hume on this issue, one that connects normativity to reflexivity. The idea here in its most general form is that in so far as Hume's causal account of belief can be turned on itself, to explain our beliefs about human cognition and action, it acquires thereby normative force, so that Hume's theory gives us not merely an explanation but also a justification of our mechanism for forming beliefs. Korsgaard herself has presented such an interpretation. On her reading of the *Treatise*, Hume appeals implicitly to the claim that "a faculty's verdicts are normative if the faculty meets the following test: *when the faculty takes itself and its own operations for its object, it gives a positive verdict*." Korsgaard says that for Hume, the understanding fails this test (thus the gloomy pessimism in I.IV.VII, at the end of Book One), but the moral sense passes it, because, Hume claims, reflection on the origin of our moral sentiments causes us to approve of those sentiments even more strongly.

I am going to concentrate, however, not on Korsgaard but instead on the reading of Hume that Annette Baier presents in her book *A Progress of Sentiments*. Baier's interpretation is more interesting for my purposes than Korsgaard's because, first, it is part of a comprehensive reading of Hume's *Treatise*, and second, because unlike Korsgaard Baier takes Hume to offer a position that vindicates the normativity of cognitive and practical beliefs alike. Indeed, the entire book is

a coherent reading of the whole of Hume's system intended to answer the Kantian objection about normativity. Baier's view is that "successful reflexivity" just "is normativity."

The question I want to ask is, why should we think that the fact that Hume's view can be applied to itself entails any sort of justification for it, or an obligation on the reader's part to assent to it? As a first step, let's consider Baier's own summary of her argument, which she presents as a lengthy causal chain. First we have regularities in nature, what Hume of course calls 'constant conjunctions,' and minds observing these regularities. This results in the formation in the mind of an idea of the necessity or determination of the ideas so perceived. In reflecting on the philosophical question of the "truth-presenting power" of this idea of causal necessity, we formulate the hypothesis that this idea too is an effect of the perception of constantly conjoined ideas, and find "confirmation" of this in the absence of counter-examples to it and in the similarity of the human mind to other thing in nature. This results in turn in increased self-awareness of the constant conjunctions that affect us, and the effect these have on our thought and action. In the end, the process results in "increased self-confidence in endorsing... the habits of inference that have proved not just self-correcting (since experience-determined), but able to be turned without incoherence on themselves." Thus this causal chain issues finally in a conviction that our cognitive processes produce justified belief.

I will now consider some difficulties with Baier's approach to Hume's normativity problem. Ultimately, I will conclude that her reconstruction fails to solve Hume's problem, but reaching this conclusion in a way that does justice to the force of her argument will require some care.

Consider how the causal sequence Baier describes might produce some justification for the account of causation that it exemplifies. We might naively surmise that the views gets its justification from the gathering of more and more evidence for an inductive inference about its truth. Of course this won't do, since the issue of normativity as it relates to Hume's account of causation is precisely whether it can support a claim of justification for inductive inference. So the significance of the application of the causal principle to mind of the subject that grasps this principle cannot lie simply in the fact that this application adds evidence for the justification of the principle. There must be something in particular about the application to the mind, something that makes the application to the mind qualitatively different from the application to, say, billiard balls. This is just what is suggested by the emphasis on reflexivity. But what might that be?

Baier's answer seems to be that the crucial result of applying Hume's view to the mind is

that it increases our confidence in these inferences, and thus in the view itself. But increased confidence by itself can neither provide nor be normativity. It is easy to imagine a psychological regimen akin to brainwashing that causes those under its influence to feel ever-increasing confidence in the regimen, but we would not say, at least without knowing a great deal more, that this confidence was justified. The analogy between brainwashing and a philosophical view may seem unfair, but it seems so, I think, only because of an implicit assumption that the philosophical view reinforces confidence through a process of rational evaluation. And that is just my point: Baier's reading of Hume can achieve her aim only by means of surreptitious appeal to rational norms for which there is no place within Hume's theory– unless it is assumed that causal connections can somehow also be rational ones. But the point of Baier's reconstruction is to show how rational norms can *emerge* from causal connections. If we are to take it that causal connections are also rational ones, then Baier's reconstruction, consisting as it does entirely of causal connections, would be superfluous.

Let us see whether Korsgaard's approach can help here. I want to leave aside the aspects of Korsgaard's reading of Hume that pertain only to her general account of reflective endorsement, and focus in particular on her construal of the reflexivity of Hume's theory. Like Baier, Korsgaard characterizes the result of successful reflexivity as increased confidence, and I have argued that confidence *per se* cannot provide normativity. But on Korsgaard's account this confidence has a particular basis: The successful reflexivity of the moral sense shows that "there is no *intelligible challenge* that can be made to its claims." Regarding moral sense, Korsgaard thinks, we can ask whether it is in our interest, and we can also ask whether it accords with our duties of benevolence to others. Hume shows, she thinks, that both these questions can be answered in the affirmative, and there are just no other perspectives internal to morality from which one can inquire about the goodness or value of the moral sense. So for Korsgaard, the significance of reflexivity is, as she says, negative: it is evidence (apparently conclusive) of the absence of cogent objections to the theory. Though her chief interest is in the normativity of moral claims, she takes Hume to offer "an account of normativity which is completely general, applying to any kind of purportedly normative claim." Is reflexivity, so construed, sufficient to provide us with a reason to take it to be the basis for (or, as Baier says, identical with) normativity in general?

I suggest that it is not. Showing that there is evidence that there are no cogent objections to a view is very different from showing there are reasons *for* the view. Consider what reflective endorsement might mean in relation to our question about Hume. On the one hand, reflective

endorsement of Hume's theory might entail consideration of the grounds supporting it. But this presumes that we already have a normative perspective available. This normative perspective must be derived either from outside the theory, in which case the theory itself is not the source of its own normativity; or from within it, which would beg the question we are concerned with. On the other hand, reflective endorsement in this context might refer simply to the application of Hume's causal account of belief to our belief in that account, as we have discussed earlier. But this could show at most that Hume's theory is not open to objection on the grounds that it is internally inconsistent, not that it is not open to any intelligible objection whatsoever. As Kant observes, "a non-contradictory concept falls short of showing the possibility of its object." The Kantian objection to causal accounts of belief is not, after all, that such accounts provide only very weak justification for those beliefs, but rather that they do no speak to the normative question at all. The mere fact that Hume's causal account of belief can be applied successfully to itself does nothing to defeat this objection.

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Юм и физики

Hume and the Physicists

В философии вообще и в философии науки в особенности Дэвид Юм главным образом известен своим стремлением снизить значение концепта причинности до регулярности следования друг за другом сходных событий. Данный аргумент выводится из критериев, которые он вводит для определения одного события как причины другого, являющегося его эффектом: регулярности, смежности, необходимости, - что позволяет ему сделать вывод об отсутствии независимого значения у «естественной необходимости». Однако

Юм ошибался, заявляя, что не существует впечатлений, то есть опыта причинности как эффективности – они даны нам в том, что Гибсон назвал эффордансами (дословно «позволительностями» - affordances), когда мы видим, как нож режет хлеб.

Мы привычно проводим различие между животными и людьми, поскольку первые реагируют на стимулы, а вторые действуют целесообразно. Если бы было возможно дать нейрофизиологическое объяснение нейронным связям, вызывающим второй тип поведения, то отличие человеческого зрения, обоняния и слуха от соответствующих способностей животных было очевидным задолго до того, как появилась нейрофизиология.

В случаях, когда связь между причиной и эффектом не наблюдаема, не осязаема и неслышна, ученые могут конструировать модели возможных каузальных механизмов, устанавливающие причинно-следственные связи между событиями. Такие модели в основном иерархичны и заканчиваются на существах, являющихся естественными деятелями (природными агентами), как например электроны и магнитные поля. Причинная эффективность может быть подтверждена как эмпирический концепт, если мы хотим создать реалистичное прочтение физики.

Concept of Causality in 18th Century Physics.

I believe that we cannot really understand the depths of Hume's account of causality without attending to the historical circumstances in which he came to formulate it – one of which was the state of theoretical physics at the time – the development of the idea of forces and fields in the physics of Newton to Boscovich and beyond.

Prompted by 17C reflections on the question where the activity or impetus comes from – according to Descartes ultimately from God – philosophers of physics, many them physicists, tried to locate the source of the activity in the universe in the here and now. The concept of `causal power' was used by Locke to clarify his distinction between primary and secondary qualities – secondary qualities are powers, but they are grounded in arrangements of particles exhibiting only primary qualities. Boyle took very much the same view. Powers were not fundamental for either of them.

However, perhaps inspired by Leibniz, by the 18C some philosophically minded physicists were proposing a universe of ungrounded causal powers.

1. In his private speculations – *De Natura Acidorum* – Newton proposes an ontology for physical objects that is in sharp contrast to his declaration in the principle that God created `hard, massy atoms'. In DNA he proposes a hierarchy with active material agents as the grounding of

`particles' of higher levels.

2. A world of active point centred `powers' was proposed by R. J. Boscovich as a solution to McClaurin's Paradox that emerged from considerations of the problem of reconciling incompressible atoms with a mechanics of finite forces. (If the ultimate corpuscles are incompressible then on impact they do not deform so the interaction must be instantaneous. However, F = MA, which if the time of interaction is infinitesimal entails that the force between impacting atoms must be infinite.)

Boscovich's metaphysics was echoed by Kant's analysis of matter in terms of forces of attraction and repulsion.

3. Greene, Baxter and others also developed physical theories based on powers, attractions, forces and so on. In our terms, modelling basic natural beings on the stuff of ordinary life is a mistake. `If a wall is made of bricks held together by mortar, and each brick is made up of smaller bricks held together by mortar, in the end we have to admit there are no bricks, but only mortar'.

I believe Hume arrived at his sceptical analysis of causality from his analysis of experience as atomistic impressions reflected in ideas, and an antipathy to dispositional concepts used ontologically. From the *Treatise* to the *Enquiry* he moves towards a confrontation with the pretensions of theoretical natural science, via the deployment of his psychological analysis of causal efficacy.

Two Reminders

Hume's analysis of experience – impressions and ideas, the former being radically atomistic – entailed that successive events must be existentially independent and so conceptually independent.

The famous three component analysis of the concept of causality.

a. Regularity

b. Contiguity

c. Necessity as habit of expectation.

In Hume's own words (A *Treatise of Human Nature* (1739) Part 3, Section 1, p 148-9, Fontana-Collins, 1972) - `We must not here be content with saying that the idea of cause and effect arises from objects constantly united, but must affirm, that it is the very same with the idea of these objects, and that the necessary connection is not discovered by a conclusion of the understanding, but is merely a perception of the mind ... [in the case of a moving body striking another and causing it to move, on the basis of] this constant union it *forms* the idea of cause and

effect, and by its influence *feels* the necessity'. So being a cause and being an effect are not attributes of `objects' of perception but only of ideas of such objects. The analysis becomes psychological rather than natural scientific.

We usually classify causes by reference to their effects – a happening or a material substance, individual or mass, is only identified as a cause by reference to the effect it usually brings about.

Hume's arguments against power, efficacy and so on.

Hume declares that there is no contradiction in conjoining a description of the cause with the negation of a description of the effect. `The match was struck and the paper did not burn' is not contradictory, even though we feel entitled to say that a struck match causes paper to ignite, on the basis of our regular observations of such close pairing of phenomena.

Reply: Any causal claim is always qualified with a ceteris paribus clause – all else being equal. This licences an investigator to study the situation in which the paper did not ignite to find the necessary condition which failed – e.g. paper not dry, and so on.

A causal process is naturally necessary when the ceteris paribus conditions are exhausted by the state of natural science.

Hume declares that we have no impression of causal efficacy and so the idea of causal necessity must be based on some other impression. That impression is the frequency with which we encounter the conjunction like events.

Reply: It is false to declare that power, efficacy and so on are not observable phenomena. Michotte's experiments back up common experience. There are impressions of material activity from which ideas of causal power can be derived.

Though the experience of resisting a force being applied by a powerful particular to some part of one's body is a common experience it has not been successfully used to defeat the argument that there is no impression of causal power. I cannot see why not.

To tie up all the loose ends Hume needs to show that causal necessity is conceptually tied to efficacy or power, that is that the two arguments, 1 and 2 above, are linked. That would support his strategy of using 1 to support 2.

The Ontology of Causes in the Humean Era

Substances as causes

Powerful particulars – e.g moving material bodies – involves the notion of impetus or momentum, refined into kinetic energy and mechanical work. Latter in the 19th century mechanical energy was linked to heat and electrical phenomena.

Extended fields – e.g. magnetic fields [*orbis virtutis* of Gilbert]. Any suitable object that enters

such a domain and released is accelerates in a definite direction. This displays the causal powers of the field.

Hybrid – Newton's gravity, magnetic poles and electric charges, and Boscovich's `point atoms' are the origins of fields so all have this character.

Events as causes

Striking a match, closing a switch, striking a window, stimulating a response, and so on.

Hume's examples illustrate his complete failure to grasp what had happened in his own life time – the rise of natural science. In Sect IV, Part I of *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding* 1748 (p 28 Oxford Edition 1951) – they include atmospheric pressure holding two smooth surfaces together, explosion of gunpowder, attraction of a loadstone, one billiard ball communicating motion to another and the like. Hume's argument is simple - `were we brought of a sudden into this world [we fancy we could] at first have inferred [that these cause –effect relations would occur].

No doubt - but while it does follow that `the mind can never possibly find the effect in the supposed cause, by the most accurate *scrutiny and examination'* it does not follow that asked to infer what would happen if some object were presented to us [and without consulting past observation] `after what manner, I beseech you, must the mind proceed to this operation?' Well, by the development of physical and chemical theory! It is simply not true that all the laws of nature are known only by experience – Special Relativity will do to refute that idea! And it is not so difficult for a chemist to work out whether a certain novel combination of chemicals will explode even before it has been tried. We understand endothermic and exothermic reactions very well.

Many modern discussions of causality have centred around `b', for example the proposal by David Lewis (`Causation', *Journal of Philosophy*, 70, 556 – 567) for a formal analysis of `the' relation of `causation'.

It seems clear from the two pages of example in the *Enquiry* (28 – 9) that Hume's targets are the pretensions of natural scientists to be able to use theory to arrive at knowledge of phenomena prior to experience of those phenomena – some (Eddington for one) might argue that it is possible to work out from first principles what the world is like – the nature of this world playing no part among the premises of the theoretical derivation.

The passage in *Enquiry* p. 29 in which Hume remarks that he can *conceive* of all sorts of consequences of one billiard ball striking another, is quite compatible with mechanics informing us what effect must occur *ceteris paribus*. If it does not, there is something in the situation which

will account for it. In direct confrontation with the physics of his day Hume declares (*Enquiry,* p. 30) that since every effect is a distinct event from its cause – we have the reason why no rational and modest scientist `has ever pretended to assign the ultimate cause of any natural operation or to show distinctly that action of that power which produces any single effect in the universe'. But that is exactly what the field physics of his own day and its development into our times has succeeded in doing.

The Status of Dispositions, Tendencies and Propensities

Locke solved part of the problem of the status of properties that are displayed only occasionally and only in certain conditions by proposing a continuously existing enabling condition for each propensity – e.g. permanent arrangements of corpuscles in the surfaces of coloured things. This could be interpreted as a particular or as a general feature of all things which have a certain disposition. [Actually not scientifically correct – different enabling conditions may support the same display, and the same enabling conditions might support different displays depending on the conditions].

However he did not solve the other part – the nature of the active power of forceful dispositions. Hume's importance in shaping philosophical discussions of causality in the subsequent centuries was his denial that such a concept makes sense – that is could have any empirical application – the reverse side of his claim that there is no impression corresponding to the idea of causal necessity or efficacy. Ironically, while philosophers for the most part struggled with Hume's `epistemic atomism' physicists and chemists continued to develop substantival activity concepts in their own descriptive and explanatory discourses.