Institute of Philosophy
of the Russian Academy of Sciences

  Alexey Pavlov
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Alexey Pavlov

Year and place of birth

  ORCID ID: 0000-0002-4118-1827
 Web of Science Researcher ID: CAG-1639-2022
 Scopus Author ID: 57223822932
 Ринц Author ID: 156576
 ISTINA Researcher ID: alexeyspavlov


16 march 1994, Moscow






  • Bachelor degree of Moscow State Pedagogical University, the Faculty of Philology (2011–2015)
  • Undergraduate student of the Faculty of Philosophy of Moscow State University, the Department of the History of Foreign Philosophy (2016–2018)
  • Postgraduate student of the Faculty of Philosophy of Moscow State University, the Department of the History of Foreign Philosophy (2018–2021).


Academic Degrees

  • PhD in Philosophy (2021). PhD Thesis: «"New Mysterianism” of Colin McGinn» (Moscow State University)

Scientific Interests

  • History of Western Philosophy
  • Analytic Philosophy

Topics of special researchers

  • Analytic Philosophy of Mind
  • Analytic Theology
  • Analytic Metaphysics


Junior Research Fellow, Institute of Philosophy, Russian Academy of Sciences – since 2021






This article aims to give an introductory overview of Property Nominalism in contemporary analytic metaphysics for a Russian-speaking reader. The question of the level and order relations between different properties has been much debated in analytic philosophy over the last 100 years. However, analytic philosophers have often given much less attention to more fundamental questions of the ontological status of properties and how properties relate to the objects that instantiate them. The most plausible answer to these questions would be Property Nominalism which is well compatible with Physicalism – the Weltanschauung currently dominant among analytic philosophers. As in the case of medieval nominalism, the pathos of Property Nominalism is in eliminating redundant entities in our ontology. However, it should be distinguished from the nominalism of Willard V.O. Quine, Alfred Tarski and Nelson Goodman, which extends not only to universals but to the entire class of abstract objects. Property Nominalism is subdivided into Non-reductive (Ostrich) and Reductive Nominalism. The latter includes Predicative (or Conceptual) Nominalism, Class Nominalism, Tropes Nominalism and Resemblance Nominalism, presented in the works of Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra. In the opinion of the author of this article, we will arrive at an optimal solution to the problem of universals if we adhere to the explanatory models of Ostrich Nominalism and Resemblance Nominalism. The advantages of these theories are that they do not postulate any additional entities and do not require us to develop a specialized theory of substance.

This article is dedicated to a bit surprising but nevertheless quite an appropriate question – the perspectives of the apophatic method in contemporary analytic theology. According to the expert opinion, the analytic theology could be characterized as mainly cataphatic tradition making a bet on logical and clear argumentation while the apophatic method is more popular in contemporary continental theology. Meanwhile, reasons for standing the question about analytic apophaticism could be found in the very analytic philosophy. In order to prove this position ideas of American analytic theologians David Bentley Hart and Simon Hewitt are considered. Based on the example of their works the conclusion is drawn that locus classicus of analytic apophaticism is the thesis about non-referentiality of the word "God". There is no something especially new in this claim. The novelty of analytic apophaticism is what this thesis means in the light of contemporary analytic metaphysics. In relation to the physicalistic stance, the non-referentiality of the "God" thesis means only that "God" in the strict sense doesn't exist – if it is accepted as an axiom that any existence is necessarily physical existence. Still, if it wasn't so, there will be no room for the act of faith. God reveals Himself to us not only in abstract knowledge but, rather, in existentia, the human "dimension" of our existing. This means that for believers the admitting the physical non-reality (and, thus, principal non-knowability) of God is the path for faith free from encroachment on and understanding of His nature. 
This article attempts to develop Christian Physicalism within the boundaries of Orthodoxy theology, and it also offers an assessment of their conceptual compatibility. Christian Physicalism is the result of the application of the physicalist approach in the analytic philosophy of mind to the circle of problems of Analytic Theology. This is a thesis postulating the physical character of the soul. It implies anthropological monophysitism because it holds that body and soul have the same nature. Orthodoxy Theology generally operates within the framework of ancient philosophy while Christian Physicalism is the crown of the contemporary analytic tradition. Comparison of these two types of discourses is possible since Christian Physicalism it do not touch the dogmatized areas of Orthodoxy Theology. However, it implies some substantial consequences both for the whole of Christian Anthropology and for the Chalcedonian Christology in many respects proceeding from it. In particular, difficulties arise in explaining human posthumous experience, the hypostatic identity of Christ, and trichotomous anthropological models. Moreover, there is not clear whether physicalists’ views on these questions are compatible with the Christian worldview at all. The latter characterized by the idea of the personal and phenomenal character of human experience. The main question, therefore, is what kind of explanation of these attributes does Christian Physicalism offer? The theoretical speculations of Christian Physicalism go against not only the beliefs of common-sense but also the strong intuitions of a religious worldview. But the point is not so much in the terminology of analytical metaphysics, as in the very human way of describing the world. Trying to think rationally about God, we use concepts designed to describe the facts of the physical world, which inevitably leads to a biasing of our picture of the world.


This article is dedicated to the “analytic” line in the philosophy of modern stoicism. Modern stoicism is developed as the philosophy of life but in this relation, it is understood as not the collection of speculations around such concepts as “life”, “human” and so on but rather as the philosophy about well living. It indicates that the goal of modern stoicism is integrating the eudemonic stance in the analytic normative ethics in which this movement was raised. Modern stoics explains the applicability of stoic ethics for 20st-century people in the way that their view on the world as they think is similar to such of Hellenistic people in many respects. On the theoretical level, modern stoicism is the attempt of application of ethics of late Stoa to the contemporary naturalistic worldview constituting around the data of natural science. This task is realized by representing the ethics of Rome stoicism as a collection of certain psychological practices. By means of it, it turns out possible to represent stoic ethics as some kind of the “framework” of behavior that is potentially compatible with various worldviews. But in this advantage of modern stoicism there is its main trouble also. Cleared out from metaphysics and based on certain obvious practical premises, this framework of sensible staid behavior tells us nothing about the world and hence couldn’t be used as the full-blown worldview. However, the very raising of this movement indicates the need to explicitly formulating the problem of worldview within the analytic philosophy.

  • Metaphilosophical pessimism of C. McGinn // Izvestija Saratovskogo universiteta. Novaya Serija. Serija Filosofija. Psihologija. Pedagogika [Bulletin of Saratov University, New series, Philosophy, Psychology, Pedagogy], Vol. 21, № 1. pp. 39–42. (in Russian). DOI: 10.18500/1819-7671-2021-21-1-39-42

This article is dedicated to the metaphilosophical pessimism of C. McGinn. McGinn is known as a main proponent of “new mysterianism” in the contemporary analytic philosophy of mind. According to mysterianism, we can’t solve the mind-body problem because of the natural cognitive limitations on our side. McGinn’s view on the nature of philosophy is the component of this conception. In general, mysterian metaphilosophy didn’t get enough coverage in the research literature but it deserves a bigger interest. McGinn argues that philosophy is actually a combination of unsolvable problems. He identifies the scientific/philosophical demarcation criterion as the potential solvability for the human mind. However, this metaphilosophical position faces serious difficulties. At first, if the objec- tions of U. Kriegel and D. Dennett are right and the mysterian cognitive closure thesis is not sufficiently proved, then the termination of research on a number of philosophical issues may also be an unreasoned decision. Secondly, there is a threat of performative contradiction. But we could try to explain this contradiction by considering the style of analytic philosophy itself which is characterized by dialogical form and free dealing with the ideas considered as possible options. In the article, the standard methods of historico-philosophical investigation are used including the comparative analysis and the principle of objective analysis of a text in the work with sources.



The argument from analogy is founded by an obvious idea about the limitedness of human understanding. McGinn uses this argument to prove the thesis of the radical impossibility of solving the mind-body problem. But the analysis of the W. James’s paper “Is life worth living” (1895) containing the same idea shows that argument from analogy isn’t adequacy to proving the strong thesis of cognitive closure. It demonstrates the persuasiveness of antimys- terian objections of D. Dennett and U. Kriegel and of the common opinion of the hypothetical character of the mysterian argumentation of C. McGinn.

This article is one of the first articles in Russian discussing Richard Swinburne’s recent views on the mind-body problem. Richard Swinburne is a contemporary British theologian and analytic philosopher specializing in the philosophy of religion and philosophy of science. In the philosophy of mind, Swinburne defends a quite unpopular position – the substance dualism. This position is based on cartesian dualism and some old scholastic conceptions. Swinburne tries to advocate all versions of the mind-body dualism: he moves from the predicate dualism to the property dualism and then from the property dualism to the substance dualism. As Descartes, Swinburne sees the mental and the physical as two separate domains. In particular, he denies the supervenience the- sis which is shared now by most analytic philosophers of mind and appeals to causal interactionism between mental and physical events. Moreover, Swinburne uses the concept of substance. He defines the substance as something that is not reduced to a collection of properties instantiated in it. With regard to the problem of the nature of a human being, Swinburne shares the compound dualism, according to which the nature of a human being consists of two parts: the essential (mental substance) and the non-essential (physical substance). Based on his substance dualism and the modal argument of Descartes, Swinburne claims that the existence of the consciousness does not depend on the existence of the physical body. The author gives some objections against Swinburne’s substance dualism. Some of these objections are based on the arguments of other famous analytic philosophers. The conclusion states that we cannot take Swinburne’s substance dualism as a correct mind-body theory. The author argues that this philosophical conception introduces many unjustified hypotheses and it actually does not do its explanatory job.

This article is one of the first articles in Russian, in which an attempt is made to review and analyze the transcendental naturalism of Colin McGinn as the methodological approach in the contemporary analytic philosophy. The ideas underlying transcendental naturalism are analyzed, as well as the main points of McGinn’s argumentation are discussed. An original review of the main problems of transcendental naturalism is proposed. The author draws conclusions about the place of transcendental naturalism in the contemporary analytic philosophy, its effectiveness and possible ways for the further development of this conception.



  • McGinn, Colin // Scientific-educational encyclopedic portal "Knowledges", 2022 (in Russian).
  • Mysterianism // Scientific-educational encyclopedic portal "Knowledges", 2022 (in Russian).



The Russian translation of the two essays from the recent Colin McGinn’s book Philosophical Provocations, in which he discusses the a priori / a posteriori distinction and truth as a necessary condition of knowledge.





This article is a review of Ben Lazare Mijuskovic’s book «Consciousness and Loneliness: Theoria and Praxis» (2018). The problem of the dividedness of the contemporary philosophy into the two different traditions has recently become apparent. This is evidenced by the growth of a number of investigations aiming to embrace contemporary thought in its wholeness. Among such studies is the new work of American philosopher Ben Lazare Mijuskovic. He attempts to defend the human microcosm from the threat of its neglection by philosophical naturalism. However, it is not only Mijuskovic’s anti-naturalistic position that is interesting. He also provides an in-depth analysis of such an Exis- tenzial of the human life as loneliness. The rich philosophical material drawn by the author is an indisputable merit of the study. However, this same merit also constitutes a problem. Mijuskovic’s arguments are reduced to a mere repetition of the philosophical ideas of the past and are thus unable to undermine contemporary naturalism. Meanwhile, the parts of the study in which the phenomenon of loneliness is discussed are the most interesting part of the book. Mijuskovic discusses loneliness as the feeling of loneliness per se and does not replace its phenomenological analysis by an economical investigation or by an evolutionary explanation. The author’s recognition of the significance of the content of conscious experience leads him to a disagreement with naturalism and to the acceptance of the position of substance dualism along with its known shortcomings. It seems that such a move is not at all necessary. In order for the content of our conscious experience to become significant, there is no need to exaggerate the ontological autonomy of the very conscious experience. It is always possible to commit to «weaker» ontological views without abandoning the scientific worldview and common sense. 

Participation at conferences


  • Christian Physicalism: Critics and Contracritics // Theoretical seminar «Scientiae de Religione» of the Department of Philosophy of Religion, Institute of Philosophy, RAS, 19 january, 2023.


  • Peter van Inwagen: Philosophical Problems of the Christian doctrine of the Resurrection of the Dead // Roundtable discussion «Philosophy of Religion, metaphysics and epistemology: to the 90th anniversary of Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas Walterstorff and to the 80th anniversary of Peter van Inwagen"», Institute of Philosophy, RAS, Russia, 25–26 october 2022 (in Russian).
  • Nominlalistic approaches to solving the Problem of Universals in the contemporary Analytic Metaphysics // The seminar «The History of Philosophy: Legacy and Project». Institute of Philosophy, RAS, Russia, 7 june, 2022 (in Russian).


  • Apophaticism and Analytic Theology // XXVIII International scientific conference of students, graduate students and young scientists "Lomonosov-2021". Section "History of Foreign Philosophy", Russia, April 19, 2021 (in Russian)



  • Microproperty Dualism and the Modern Cartesian Dualism // SECOND INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF THE RUSSIAN SOCIETY FOR THE HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE SCIENCE AS A PUBLIC GOOD, St. Petersburg, Russia, November 27-29, 2020 (in Russian)
  • Mysterianism of C. McGinn: basic ideas, critics and perspectives // Philosophical workshop. Fifth meeting within the "Laboratory" Cycle, Institute of Philosophy RAS, Russia, February 27, 2020 (in Russian)



  • Objections of U. Kriegel to the mysterian approach of C. McGinn to solution the Mind-Body Problem // International scientific conference of students, graduate students and young scientists "Lomonosov-2018". Section "History of Foreign Philosophy", Russia, April 9-13, 2018 (in Russian)

Scientific and organizational work

  • Editor of the pages of the sector of the History of Western Philosophy on the website of the Institute of Philosophy, RAS.

Participation in the editorial boards of scientific journals



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Web-page in Russian