Institute of Philosophy
of the Russian Academy of Sciences




  Alexey Pavlov
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Alexey Pavlov

Alexey Pavlov, Junior Research Fellow at the Department of Western Philosophy




Year and place of birth

 

16 march 1994, Moscow

 

 

 

Education

  • Bachelor degree of Moscow State Pedagogical University, the Faculty of Philology (2011–2015)
  • Undergraduate student of the Faculty of Philosophy of Moscow State University, the Department of the History of Foreign Philosophy (2016–2018)
  • Postgraduate student of the Faculty of Philosophy of Moscow State University, the Department of the History of Foreign Philosophy (2018–2021).

 

Researcher ID

Ученые степени

22.11.2021 Ph.D. thesis was defended on the topic “Novoe misterianstvo" K. Makginna" ["New Mysterianism” of Colin McGinn] (in Russian) (supervisor of the RAS, Doctor of Philosophical Sciences, Prof. V.V. Vasiliev; Moscow State University, Moscow)

 

Scientific Interests

  • History of Western Philosophy
  • Analytic Philosophy

  

Topics of special researchers

  • Analytic Philosophy of Mind
  • Analytic Theology
  • Analytic Metaphysics

Career

Junior Research Fellow, Institute of Philosophy, Russian Academy of Sciences – since 2021

 

Publications

 

 PAPERS


 

2021

This article is dedicated to the “analytic” line in the philosophy of modern stoicism. Modern stoicism is developed as the philosophy of life but in this relation, it is understood as not the collection of speculations around such concepts as “life”, “human” and so on but rather as the philosophy about well living. It indicates that the goal of modern stoicism is integrating the eudemonic stance in the analytic normative ethics in which this movement was raised. Modern stoics explains the applicability of stoic ethics for 20st-century people in the way that their view on the world as they think is similar to such of Hellenistic people in many respects. On the theoretical level, modern stoicism is the attempt of application of ethics of late Stoa to the contemporary naturalistic worldview constituting around the data of natural science. This task is realized by representing the ethics of Rome stoicism as a collection of certain psychological practices. By means of it, it turns out possible to represent stoic ethics as some kind of the “framework” of behavior that is potentially compatible with various worldviews. But in this advantage of modern stoicism there is its main trouble also. Cleared out from metaphysics and based on certain obvious practical premises, this framework of sensible staid behavior tells us nothing about the world and hence couldn’t be used as the full-blown worldview. However, the very raising of this movement indicates the need to explicitly formulating the problem of worldview within the analytic philosophy.

 

This article is dedicated to the metaphilosophical pessimism of C. McGinn. McGinn is known as a main proponent of “new mysterianism” in the contemporary analytic philosophy of mind. According to mysterianism, we can’t solve the mind-body problem because of the natural cognitive limitations on our side. McGinn’s view on the nature of philosophy is the component of this conception. In general, mysterian metaphilosophy didn’t get enough coverage in the research literature but it deserves a bigger interest. McGinn argues that philosophy is actually a combination of unsolvable problems. He identifies the scientific/philosophical demarcation criterion as the potential solvability for the human mind. However, this metaphilosophical position faces serious difficulties. At first, if the objec- tions of U. Kriegel and D. Dennett are right and the mysterian cognitive closure thesis is not sufficiently proved, then the termination of research on a number of philosophical issues may also be an unreasoned decision. Secondly, there is a threat of performative contradiction. But we could try to explain this contradiction by considering the style of analytic philosophy itself which is characterized by dialogical form and free dealing with the ideas considered as possible options. In the article, the standard methods of historico-philosophical investigation are used including the comparative analysis and the principle of objective analysis of a text in the work with sources.

 

2020

The argument from analogy is founded by an obvious idea about the limitedness of human understanding. McGinn uses this argument to prove the thesis of the radical impossibility of solving the mind-body problem. But the analysis of the W. James’s paper “Is life worth living” (1895) containing the same idea shows that argument from analogy isn’t adequacy to proving the strong thesis of cognitive closure. It demonstrates the persuasiveness of antimys- terian objections of D. Dennett and U. Kriegel and of the common opinion of the hypothetical character of the mysterian argumentation of C. McGinn.

 

This article is one of the first articles in Russian discussing Richard Swinburne’s recent views on the mind-body problem. Richard Swinburne is a contemporary British theologian and analytic philosopher specializing in the philosophy of religion and philosophy of science. In the philosophy of mind, Swinburne defends a quite unpopular position – the substance dualism. This position is based on cartesian dualism and some old scholastic conceptions. Swinburne tries to advocate all versions of the mind-body dualism: he moves from the predicate dualism to the property dualism and then from the property dualism to the substance dualism. As Descartes, Swinburne sees the mental and the physical as two separate domains. In particular, he denies the supervenience the- sis which is shared now by most analytic philosophers of mind and appeals to causal interactionism between mental and physical events. Moreover, Swinburne uses the concept of substance. He defines the substance as something that is not reduced to a collection of properties instantiated in it. With regard to the problem of the nature of a human being, Swinburne shares the compound dualism, according to which the nature of a human being consists of two parts: the essential (mental substance) and the non-essential (physical substance). Based on his substance dualism and the modal argument of Descartes, Swinburne claims that the existence of the consciousness does not depend on the existence of the physical body. The author gives some objections against Swinburne’s substance dualism. Some of these objections are based on the arguments of other famous analytic philosophers. The conclusion states that we cannot take Swinburne’s substance dualism as a correct mind-body theory. The author argues that this philosophical conception introduces many unjustified hypotheses and it actually does not do its explanatory job.

 

This article is one of the first articles in Russian, in which an attempt is made to review and analyze the transcendental naturalism of Colin McGinn as the methodological approach in the contemporary analytic philosophy. The ideas underlying transcendental naturalism are analyzed, as well as the main points of McGinn’s argumentation are discussed. An original review of the main problems of transcendental naturalism is proposed. The author draws conclusions about the place of transcendental naturalism in the contemporary analytic philosophy, its effectiveness and possible ways for the further development of this conception.

 

Translations

The Russian translation of the two essays from the recent Colin McGinn’s book Philosophical Provocations, in which he discusses the a priori / a posteriori distinction and truth as a necessary condition of knowledge.

 

Reviews

This article is a review of Ben Lazare Mijuskovic’s book «Consciousness and Loneliness: Theoria and Praxis» (2018). The problem of the dividedness of the contemporary philosophy into the two different traditions has recently become apparent. This is evidenced by the growth of a number of investigations aiming to embrace contemporary thought in its wholeness. Among such studies is the new work of American philosopher Ben Lazare Mijuskovic. He attempts to defend the human microcosm from the threat of its neglection by philosophical naturalism. However, it is not only Mijuskovic’s anti-naturalistic position that is interesting. He also provides an in-depth analysis of such an Exis- tenzial of the human life as loneliness. The rich philosophical material drawn by the author is an indisputable merit of the study. However, this same merit also constitutes a problem. Mijuskovic’s arguments are reduced to a mere repetition of the philosophical ideas of the past and are thus unable to undermine contemporary naturalism. Meanwhile, the parts of the study in which the phenomenon of loneliness is discussed are the most interesting part of the book. Mijuskovic discusses loneliness as the feeling of loneliness per se and does not replace its phenomenological analysis by an economical investigation or by an evolutionary explanation. The author’s recognition of the significance of the content of conscious experience leads him to a disagreement with naturalism and to the acceptance of the position of substance dualism along with its known shortcomings. It seems that such a move is not at all necessary. In order for the content of our conscious experience to become significant, there is no need to exaggerate the ontological autonomy of the very conscious experience. It is always possible to commit to «weaker» ontological views without abandoning the scientific worldview and common sense. 

 

Participation at conferences

2021

  • Apofatizm i analiticheskaja teologija [Apophaticism and Analytic Theoloy] // XXVIII International scientific conference of students, graduate students and young scientists "Lomonosov-2021". Section "History of Foreign Philosophy", Russia, April 19, 2021 (in Russian)

2020

  • Monism mikrosvoistv i sovremennij kartezianskij dualizm [Microproperty Dualism and the Modern Cartesian Dualism] // SECOND INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF THE RUSSIAN SOCIETY FOR THE HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE SCIENCE AS A PUBLIC GOOD, St. Petersburg, Russia, November 27-29, 2020 (in Russian)
  • Misterianstvo Kolina Makginna: osnovnye idei, kritika i perspektivy [Mysterianism of C. McGinn: basic ideas, critics and perspectives] // Philosophical workshop. Fifth meeting within the "Laboratory" Cycle, Institute of Philosophy RAS, Russia, February 27, 2020 (in Russian)

2018

  • Vozrazhenija E. Krigela protiv misterianskogo podhoda K. Makginna k resheniju problemy soznanie-telo [Objections of U. Kriegel to the mysterian approach of C. McGinn to solution the Mind-Body Problem] // International scientific conference of students, graduate students and young scientists "Lomonosov-2018". Section "History of Foreign Philosophy", Russia, April 9-13, 2018 (in Russian)

Contacts

Web-page in Russian

https://iphras.ru/alexeyspavlov.htm